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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1800s, courts have recognized but seldom used
a common-law exemption to patent infringement now known as
1
the research or experimental use exemption. This exemption to
infringement allows one party to use another party’s patented
invention “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the
purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of the [invention] to

† B.S. in Chemical Engineering, magna cum laude, 2002, University of
Minnesota-Twin Cities; J.D. expected 2005, William Mitchell College of Law.
1. See 5 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 16.03[1][a]-[b] (2002).
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2

produce its described effects.”
In 1984, following the Federal Circuit’s decision in Roche
3
Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., Congress enacted 35
U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
4
approval safe harbor provision to patent infringement. Section
271(e)(1) allows a generic drug manufacturer to make or import
and then use another company’s patented drug during the patent
term—activities that would otherwise infringe the patent—to
conduct the clinical studies required for the manufacturer to gain
5
FDA approval for its generic form of the patented drug. This safe
harbor enables a generic drug manufacturer to begin selling its
version of a drug immediately after the patent expires because FDA
6
approval will already have been obtained. Without it, the patent
holder would receive a virtual extension on its patent term of
several months or even years while the generic companies
attempted to gain FDA approval on their generic forms of the
7
drug.
2. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600).
3. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984), superseded by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (1984).
4. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d]. In addition to the FDA approval safe
harbor, the 1984 enactment, known as the “Hatch-Waxman Act” also included the
extension of patent terms and filing of “abbreviate new drug applications” among
other provisions. See infra Part II.B.
5. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). The language of § 271(e)(1) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
Id.
The FDA approval safe harbor has been extended to include implantable medical
devices, food additives, color additives, and human biological products, as those
products also require FDA approval. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S.
661, 674 (1990). The exception has also been applied to activities that the courts
have deemed to be “reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval, such as business
development and promotional activity that may be necessary to begin the FDA
approval process and is necessary to be able to effectively market the product
immediately after the patent term ends. See Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. 775
F. Supp. 1269, 1278 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (stating for the typical products requiring
FDA approval “that are extremely sophisticated, that will carry a large price tag . . .
and that are very expensive to develop, potential competitors foreseeably must
engage in considerable ‘business’ development and promotion activity just to meet
the FDA’s requirements, let alone to be in a position to market their products
meaningfully when [the patent term ends]”).
6. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d].
7. See Roche Prods., 733 F.2d at 864 (noting “[a] recent study indicated that it
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In its recent Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA decision,
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals decided that neither the
experimental use exemption nor the FDA approval safe harbor
provision allowed Merck to use Integra’s patented drug to conduct
9
research and develop a completely different and more useful drug.
The Federal Circuit has severely limited the usefulness of either
exception to the disappointment of the dissenting Judge
10
Newman.
This note argues Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA should
be overturned to allow the use of a patented drug to create
different derivative products or to compare and evaluate a new
product against the latest patented standard. Part II describes the
common law experimental use exemption and the FDA approval
11
safe harbor provision.
Part III reviews the facts, holding, and
12
dissent in Integra.
Part IV analyzes Integra in light of the
experimental use exemption and FDA approval safe harbor
13
Finally, this note concludes by proposing that the
provision.
experimental use exemption to patent infringement should be
broadened to allow all scientific research on patented subject
matter to comport with the patent specification’s full disclosure
requirement and further the patent law principles of promoting
14
innovation and rapid technological development.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Experimental Use Exemption
The common-law experimental use exemption excuses a
potential patent infringer who uses a patented invention only for
15
intellectual, non-commercial research. The exemption has been
mentioned regularly in case law but seldom applied to exempt a
now can take on average from 7 to 10 years for a pharmaceutical company to [gain
FDA approval]”).
8. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. Id. at 864 n.2, 867-68.
10. Id. at 872-78 (Newman, J., dissenting).
11. See infra Part II.
12. See infra Part III.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part V.
15. Janice M. Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use
Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1, 17
(2001).
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16

defendant from patent infringement. In recent years, there has
been a fair amount of scholarly debate about the experimental use
17
exemption and whether it should be broadened. Congress has
even proposed legislation, albeit unsuccessfully, to create a
18
statutory experimental use exemption. In modern case law, the
common-law experimental use exemption is well established, but it
19
remains weak and underutilized.
1. Origin of the Experimental Use Exemption
The experimental use exemption can be traced to 1813 when
Justice Story handed down the famous Whittemore v. Cutter
20
decision. Justice Story reasoned that “it could never have been
the intention of the legislature to punish a man, who constructed
[another’s patented invention] merely for philosophical
experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the sufficiency of
21
[the patented invention] to produce its described effects.” The
term “philosophical experiments” in Justice Story’s opinion has

16. Id.
17. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive
Rights and Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017 (1989) [hereinafter Eisenberg,
Patents]; Jennifer Miller, Sealing the Coffin on the Experimental Use Exception, 2003
DUKE L. & TECH. REV. 12; Mueller, supra note 15; Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a
Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177 (2000); Gregory N. Pate,
Analysis of the Experimental Use Exception, 3 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 253 (2002); Arti Kaur
Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science,
94 NW. U. L. REV. 77 (1999); John A. Tessensohn, Reversal of Fortune—
Pharmaceutical Experimental Use and Patent Infringement in Japan, 4 J. INT’L LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1998); Eyal H. Barash, Comment, Experimental Uses, Patents, and Scientific
Progress, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 667 (1997); Jennifer A. Johnson, Comment, The
Experimental Use Exception in Japan: A Model for U.S. Patent Law?, 12 PAC. RIM L. &
POL’Y J. 499 (2003); Jordan P. Karp, Note, Experimental Use as Patent Infringement:
The Impropriety of a Broad Exception, 100 YALE L.J. 2169 (1991).
18. H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. I (1990). The “Patent Competitiveness and
Technological Innovation Act of 1990” proposed a broad experimental use
exemption and was supported by the House Judiciary committee, but was not
enacted by Congress. Id. See also Johnson, supra note 17, at 528-29. A 1988 bill on
patenting transgenic animals also originally included an experimental use
exemption, but the exemption was later removed from the bill. Id. Upon
removing the exemption, the House Report suggested instead that sometime in
the future, Congress should enact an experimental use exemption that applies to
all inventions. Id.; H.R. REP. No. 100-888, at 51 (1988).
19. CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1].
20. 29 F. Cas. 1120 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 17,600); See also CHISUM, supra
note 1, § 16.03[1][a].
21. Whittemore, 29 F. Cas. at 1121.
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come to mean “scientific experiments” in modern usage. Justice
23
Story used identical reasoning in the case of Sawin v. Guild, which
was decided in the same year as Whittemore. The Whittemore and
Sawin decisions are credited with creating the experimental use
24
exemption.
However, since 1813, the experimental use
exemption has been only infrequently applied as a true exception
25
to patent infringement.
In the earlier first half of the twentieth century, a few courts
recognized the doctrine. A 1935 Colorado district court in Ruth v.
26
Stearns-Roger Manufacturing Co.
excused the defendant’s
manufacture and sale of parts for a patented machine to the
Colorado School of Mines because the school used the machines
27
only for experimental purposes. The court held that the “making
or using of a patented invention merely for experimental purposes,
without any intent to derive profits or practical advantage
28
therefrom, is not infringement.” Two years later in Akro Agate Co.
29
v. Master Marble Co., a West Virginia district court held that use of
a patented feature of a competitor’s marble-making machine for
“experimental testing by defendants . . . for a brief period before
going into commercial production, . . . [with a different
machine] . . . was not in law an act of infringement as marbles were
30
not commercially sold.”
Subsequently, courts applied the exemption and established it
as a defense to patent infringement. In 1944, the Southern District
31
Court of New York held in Dugan v. Lear Avia that the
experimental use exemption applied to one of the defendant’s
accused devices because “it affirmatively appeared, without
contradiction by plaintiff, that defendant built that device only
22. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860, 875 n.8 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (explaining the modern translation of the
term “philosophical experiments” as scientific experiments).
23. 21 F. Cas. 554, 555 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 12,391) (stating “the making
of a patented machine to be an offence within the purview of it, must be the
making with an intent to use for profit, and not for the mere purpose of
philosophical experiment, or to ascertain the verity and exactness of the
specification”).
24. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][a].
25. See id.
26. 13 F. Supp. 697 (D. Colo. 1935), rev’d, 87 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1936).
27. Id. at 703.
28. Id. at 713.
29. 18 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. W. Va. 1937).
30. Id. at 333.
31. 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944), aff’d, 156 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1946).
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experimentally and that it has neither manufactured it for sale nor
32
In 1958, the Court of Claims held in Chesterfield v.
sold any.”
33
United States that the United States was not liable for infringement
34
of Chesterfield’s patented metal alloy. The court held that “the
evidence shows that the portion of the [patented] alloy procured
by the defendant was used only for testing and for experimental
purposes, and there is no evidence that the remainder was used
35
other than experimentally.”
2. Restrictions on the Experimental Use Exemption
Courts have limited the experimental use exemption doctrine
when the infringer’s experimental use was coupled with
commercial exploitation or is linked to the infringer’s business
interests. Although several cases have applied the experimental use
exemption, many more have decided that it was inapplicable due to
36
the commercial nature of the defendant’s use. In one case, the
defendant’s claim that its use of a patent was “experimental only,
incidental to their search for a new [method for extracting pearl
essence] which they claim to have discovered” was rejected because
the defendant sold the pearl essence resulting from the
37
experiments.
In another case, a defendant used a patented
method for freezing fish while on a commercial fishing
38
expedition. The defendant claimed that its use was “only for the
purpose of experimentation as to the desirability of using this
method” and that defendant “reached the conclusion that it was
not necessary to use the patented method in order to get
39
satisfactory freezing.” The Ninth Circuit held the experimental
32. Id. at 229 (citing Bonsack Mach. Co. v. Underwood, 73 F. 206, 211
(C.C.E.D.N.C. 1896)).
33. 159 F. Supp. 371 (Ct. Cl. 1958).
34. Id. at 375.
35. Id. The court found that claims of the two patents at issue relating to the
metal alloys were anticipated by prior art and were invalid, but even if they were
valid, were not infringed due to the experimental use exemption. Id. The court
clearly notes that “[e]xperimental use does not infringe.” Id.
36. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][b] (citing at least twelve cases where
research or experimental use exemption is noted but still holding defendant liable
for infringement due to the commercial nature of the use).
37. Pairpearl Prods., Inc. v. Joseph H. Meyer Bros., 58 F.2d 802, 804-05 (D.
Me. 1932).
38. Spray Refrigeration Co. v. Sea Spray Fishing, Inc., 322 F.2d 34, 35 (9th
Cir. 1963).
39. Id. at 36 (noting the patented method was used only on one or two
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use exemption did not exempt an experimental use that was
40
coupled with commercial exploitation.
41
The trial court decisions of Douglas v. United States and
42
Pitcairn v. United States further exemplify limitations of the
common-law doctrine.
The Douglas court held that the
experimental use exemption had not “been permitted where there
was a pattern of systematic exploitation . . . of the accused devices
43
for the purpose of furthering the legitimate interests of the user.”
In Pitcairn, the government purchased helicopters that infringed
44
the plaintiff’s patents. Based on the experimental use exemption,
the government argued that any aircraft used for testing,
evaluation, demonstrational, or experimental purposes should be
45
excluded from the plaintiff’s compensation. The court agreed
that testing new aircraft was necessary to ensure they worked
properly, but because such tests were intended to further the
legitimate business interests of the user they were not excluded
46
from infringement.
Both Douglas and Pitcairn limited the
usefulness of the experimental use exemption if the infringing
research is to promote a legitimate business interest of the
infringer.
47
In Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceuticals Co., the Federal
Circuit refused to apply the experimental use doctrine when a
voyages).
40. Id. at 36-37. The defendant cited Chesterfield v. United States, 159 F. Supp.
371 (Ct. Cl. 1958) and Dugan v. Lear Avia, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) for
the proposition that its use was an experimental use exempt from infringement.
Id. at 36. The court disagreed and noted that neither Chesterfield nor Dugan
involved an “experimental use coupled with a commercial use.” Id.
41. 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 170 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1974) aff’d on other grounds at
510 F.2d 364 (Ct. Cl. 1975). The Court of Claims affirmed on the grounds that the
patent was invalid and did not reach the issue of experimental use. See 510 F.2d
364 (Ct. Cl. 1975).
42. 188 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 35 (Ct. Cl. Trial Div. 1975) (affirming and adopting
the trial court’s decision regarding the experimental use issue).
43. 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 177 (“At no time were the accused devices used for
amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for philosophical inquiry; to the contrary,
each use was in keeping with the legitimate business of the using agency and
served a valuable governmental and public purpose”).
44. 188 U.S.P.Q. at 47. The government purchased seven models of
helicopters that infringed fifty-nine claims in eleven of the plaintiff’s patents. Id.
at 35, 47.
45. Id. at 47. The government claimed that ninety-three of 2237 aircraft
involved in the litigation were used for experimental purposes and thus should be
excluded from plaintiff’s compensation. Id. at 46.
46. Id. at 47.
47. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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generic drug manufacturer made and used a patented drug to
perform experimental tests to gain FDA approval before the patent
48
term ended. Although Bolar argued its tests were “true scientific
inquiries,” the court stated “[w]e cannot construe the experimental
use rule so broadly as to allow a violation of the patent laws in the
guise of ‘scientific inquiry,’ when that inquiry has definite,
49
cognizable, and not insubstantial commercial purposes.”
The
Roche court severely weakened the experimental use exemption by
50
construing it as “truly narrow.”
Although the specific rule as
applied to the case’s facts has been overruled by 35 U.S.C. §
51
the court’s very narrow interpretation of the
271(e)(1),
experimental use exemption has lived on.
More recent cases also have narrowed the scope of the
experimental use exemption, refusing to apply it in cases where the
infringer has a commercial or profitable intention. For example,
52
in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., Service Engineering used
Embrex’s patented methods to test their prototype machine and to
53
solicit orders for their machine. Both the district court and the
Federal Circuit agreed that, although its uses were experimental in
nature, Service Engineering’s ultimate goal was commercialization.
The Federal Circuit held that uses for research or experimental
purposes coupled with intent to profit or commercialize would not
54
be deemed experimental only.
48. See id. at 863; see also infra Part II.B (explaining how the decision of Roche
Products, Inc. prompted the congressional enactment of the FDA approval safe
harbor, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), among other provisions).
49. Roche Prods., Inc. 733 F.2d at 863. The court refused to allow “exploitation
of a patented invention for the purpose of furthering the legitimate business
interests of the infringer” under an experimental use exemption. Id.
50. Id.
51. See infra Part II.B.
52. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
53. Id. at 1346-47.
54. Id. at 1349 (stating the experimental use exemption does not apply when
a “particular use ‘in the guise of “scientific inquiry’ ” had ‘definite, cognizable, and
not insubstantial commercial purposes.’ ”) (quoting Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar
Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 863 (Fed. Cir. 1984)). In a concurring opinion, Judge
Rader went further, stating that: “the Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis
or experimental use excuses for infringement . . . . When infringement is proven
either minimal or wholly non-commercial, the damage computation process
provides full flexibility for courts to preclude large (or perhaps any) awards for
minimal infringements.” Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d at 1352. See also Infigen, Inc. v.
Advanced Cell Tech., Inc., 65 F. Supp. 2d 967, 981 (W.D. Wis. 1999) (holding
research with the remote prospect of future commercial success cannot be an
exempt experimental use).
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55

In Madey v. Duke University, the Federal Circuit reiterated that
an experimental use that is “in any way commercial in nature”
would not be exempted from infringement by the experimental
56
use exemption. Duke University’s use appeared to be only for
57
research and education, which seemingly fits within the oft-noted
“philosophical experiments” category from the very first
58
experimental use case. The Federal Circuit held, however, that
because Duke’s business is education, Duke’s use of the patented
invention to educate students had a commercial purpose and was
59
not exempt under the experimental use exemption. Even though
education may be what Justice Story had in mind when he
mentioned “philosophical experiments” on the patented invention
60
as being exempt from infringement in 1813, today’s courts have
decided that even educational research does not fall within the
experimental use exemption.
The experimental use exemption is a nearly 200-year-old
defense to a patent infringement action. Traditionally, courts
narrowly construed and infrequently allowed it. Recently, however,
cases have interpreted the experimental use exemption so narrowly
as to nearly eliminate it.

55. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
56. Id. at 1362.
57. Madey v. Duke Univ., 266 F. Supp. 2d 420, 423 (M.D.N.C. 2001)
(“Plaintiff concedes that the overwhelming majority of Defendant’s uses of the
patented devices were for academic or experimental purposes . . . ”).
58. Whittemore v. Cutter, 29 F. Cas. 1120, 1121 (C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No.
17,600) (creating the experimental use rule and defining the rule as applying to
uses “merely for philosophical experiments, or for the purpose of ascertaining the
sufficiency of the [invention] to produce its described effects”).
59. Madey, 307 F.3d at 1362-63. The court stated:
[O]ur precedent does not immunize any conduct that is in keeping
with the alleged infringer’s legitimate business, regardless of
commercial implications. For example, major research universities,
such as Duke, often sanction and fund research projects with arguably
no commercial application whatsoever. However, these projects
unmistakably further the institution’s legitimate business objectives,
including educating and enlightening students and faculty
participating in these projects. These projects also serve, for example,
to increase the status of the institution and lure lucrative research
grants, students and faculty . . . . [T]he district court attached too great
a weight to the non-profit, educational status of Duke, effectively
suppressing the fact that Duke’s acts appear to be in accordance with
any reasonable interpretation of Duke’s legitimate business objectives.
Id.
60. See supra Part II.A.1.
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B. FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision—35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
1. The Roche Decision
61

In its 1984 Roche Products, Inc. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co.
decision, the Federal Circuit held that a generic drug
manufacturer’s infringing use of a patented drug for clinical trials
to gain FDA approval did not fall within the experimental use
62
exemption. Bolar wanted to begin marketing its generic version
63
of Roche’s patented sleep aid, Dalmane, as soon as possible.
Bolar refused to wait until Roche’s patent expired on January 17,
1984 to begin clinical trials because speed to market was vital to the
success of the generic drug and the FDA approval process could
64
take upwards of two years. Bolar purchased a quantity of Dalmine
from a foreign manufacturer in mid-1983 and began the necessary
65
Roche filed an infringement suit
testing for FDA approval.
66
against Bolar. The district court held in favor of the defendant
Bolar, reasoning that the experimental use exemption applied to
67
Bolar’s infringing use. The Federal Circuit reversed, holding “the
experimental use exception to be truly narrow,” and refused to
expand it to include Bolar’s activities, holding that Bolar’s “use is
68
solely for business reasons.”
61. 733 F.2d 858 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
62. Id. See also supra Part II.A. for a discussion of the common-law
experimental use exemption to patent infringement.
63. Id. at 860.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 572 F. Supp. 255, 258 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). The district court reasoned:
[This] court cannot find a basis for holding that Bolar’s limited
experimental use . . . constitute[s] infringement. First, Bolar realizes
no benefit during the term of the patent; its activities are in no way
connected with current manufacture or sale here or abroad. Nor do its
activities lessen Roche’s profits during the patent’s term. Second, postexpiration delay in competition unintentionally imposed by FDA
regulation is not a right or benefit granted by the patent law. This
court will not act to protect a right or benefit that is without legal basis.
Third, Roche can point to no substantial harm it will suffer from
Bolar’s FDA studies before the patent expires. Bolar’s threatened
activity is at best de minimis and will not support an action for
infringement.
Id.
68. Roche Prods., Inc., 733 F.2d at 863.
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The court recognized that the lengthy FDA approval process
granted a virtual extension of the patent term to holders of a drug
69
patent.
However, the court declined to “engage in legislative
70
activity proper only for the Congress.”
2. Congressional Reaction to Roche
In response to Roche, Congress enacted the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, also known
71
as the “Hatch-Waxman Act.” The Hatch-Waxman Act overturned
the ruling in Roche by enacting the FDA approval safe harbor
provision, codified at 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), among many other
72
provisions. Section 271(e)(1) allows a generic drug manufacturer
to make and use a patented drug during the patent term in order
73
to seek FDA approval for its generic form of the drug.
69. Id. at 863-64. The term of the drug patent is skewed at both the
beginning and the end. Id. at 864. The FDA approval process can take, in some
instances, seven to ten years. Id. At the beginning of the term, the patent
generally issues before FDA approval is received, so that the patentee must
conduct significant amounts of testing for the FDA before the drug can be
marketed, eating up a portion of the patent term. Id. At the end of the patent
term, if generic manufacturers are restricted from starting the FDA approval
process until after the patent term ends, then the patentee gains an effective
extension of the patent term past the expiration date of the patent while the
generic manufacturers complete the FDA approval process. Id. However, these
two distortions are rarely equivalent and the patent owner either loses part of its
patent monopoly or gains additional monopoly time. Id.
70. Id. at 863-64.
71. Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984).
72. In addition to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1), the Hatch-Waxman Act included
provisions for: 1) extension of drug patent terms, under 35 U.S.C. § 156, for the
amount of time it takes the patent owner to gain FDA approval; 2) authorization
for the filing of “Abbreviated New Drug Applications” (ANDAs) under 21 U.S.C. §
355(j); and 3) a special patent infringement remedy for a patent owner when a
generic manufacturer files an ANDA seeking FDA approval before the patent
covering the product has expired. See Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Construction
and Application of Hatch-Waxman Act, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984)
(Codified as Amended at 21 U.S.C.A. § 355 and 35 U.S.C.A. § 271(e) (1994)), 180
A.L.R. FED. 487 (2002). The ANDA simplifies the FDA approval process for
generic manufacturers by allowing them to piggyback on the information already
submitted by the patent owner and approved by the FDA regarding clinical trials
on humans and labeling requirements. Id. Thus the FDA approval process for
generic manufacturers is made faster, easier, and cheaper. Id.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003). The relevant text of § 271(e)(1) states:
It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to sell, or sell
within the United States or import into the United States a patented
invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the development and
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the
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Public policy strongly favors allowing generic manufacturers to
receive FDA approval as early as possible so that the cheaper
generic form of a drug will be available to consumers immediately
74
after the patent term ends.
The Hatch-Waxman Act filled in
where the Federal Circuit in Roche had refused to concede to
75
Bolar’s public policy argument and “engage in legislative activity.”
However, the Hatch-Waxman Act also provided to the patentee a
corresponding extension of the patent term for the length of time
the patentee takes to gain FDA approval by also enacting 35 U.S.C.
76
§ 156. This provision ensures that the patentee is not penalized
by the FDA approval process and still receives a full twenty years of
77
patent protection.
3. Effects of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) and 35 U.S.C. § 156
The FDA approval safe harbor provision under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1) and the patent term extension for the patent owner
under 35 U.S.C. § 156 eliminate the “distortion” at the beginning
78
and end of the patent term due to the FDA approval process. At
the beginning of the patent term, the patentee must seek FDA
79
During this time, the patentee is unable to sell its
approval.
product commercially, so the patent term is effectively shortened

manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.
Id.
Note that § 271(e)(2) qualifies the language of § 271(e)(1) by stating: “It shall be
an act of infringement . . . if the purpose of such submission is to obtain approval
under such Act to engage in the commercial manufacture, use, or sale of a
[patented] drug . . . before the expiration of the patent.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)
(2003).
74. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 872 F.2d 402, 405 (Fed. Cir.
1989), aff’d, 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (finding that “if [generic drug manufacturers]
had to wait to begin testing until after a patent expired, [that would give] an
effective extension of the patent term, which was contrary to the interests of the
public in obtaining lower cost drugs as soon as possible”).
75. See supra notes 47-51, 61-70 and accompanying text.
76. See Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984,
Pub. L. No. 98-417, Title II, 98 Stat. 1585 (Sept. 24, 1984). See also 35 U.S.C. § 156
(2003).
77. See 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003). Section 156 provides a patent term extension
for “drug products” as well as “any medical device, food additive, or color additive
subject to regulation under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.” Id. at (f).
The extension is based upon the “regulatory review period before [the product’s]
commercial marketing or use.” Id. at (a)(4).
78. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 670 (1990).
79. Id. at 669.
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by the amount of time it takes the patentee to gain FDA approval.
Section 156 allows the patent term to be extended by the amount
81
of time it takes the patentee to gain FDA approval.
At the end of the patent term, the generic manufacturer must
82
If the generic
gain FDA approval for its generic equivalent.
manufacturer must wait until the patent expires before starting
FDA approval, then the patentee can continue to sell its product
without any competition past the end of the patent term while the
83
generic manufacturers work through the FDA approval process.
Section 271(e)(1) allows the generic competitor to make the
otherwise infringing generic equivalent during the patent term to
84
gain FDA approval before the patent expires.
Thus, the
combination of § 156 and § 271(e)(1) ensure not only that generic
drugs are available immediately after the patent expires, but also
ensure that the patentee receives a uniform twenty years on its
85
patent term.
4. Judicial Interpretation of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The awkward wording of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)—“solely for uses
reasonably related to the development and submission of
86
information . . .” —has caused interpretive problems for the
courts. The strict term “solely” seems to contradict the more lax
phrase, “reasonably related” and this contradiction has led to
conflicting results in early cases interpreting the statute, although
87
the conflict seems to be resolved.
Not long after the statute’s enactment, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of California, in Scripps Clinic & Research
80. Id. at 669-70.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2003).
82. Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 670.
83. Id.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2003).
85. See Eli Lilly & Co., 496 U.S. at 669-71 (discussing in detail how the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 eliminates the
“distortion” at the beginning and end of the patent term for products requiring
FDA approval). Note that under 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) the current patent term is
twenty years, whereas at the time of the Eli Lilly decision the term was seventeen
years. Id. As of June 8, 1995, the patent term changed from seventeen years from
the date of patent issuance to twenty years from the date of filing the patent
application in order to correspond with other countries’ patent laws. Merck &
Co., v. Kessler, 80 F.3d 1543, 1547 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
86. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (emphasis added).
87. See CHISUM, supra note 1, § 16.03[1][d][iii].
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88

Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., strictly construed the language of §
271(e)(1). The court held that any use of a patented drug not
solely related to FDA approval would not be exempt from
89
infringement.
Genentech’s use of Scripps’ patented drug was
probably reasonably related to FDA approval, but it was also related
to preparation of a European patent application and development
of a process for manufacturing the drug on a commercial scale,
and thus the use was not “solely” related to FDA approval.
Therefore, Genentech’s use of the § 271(e)(1) safe harbor was
90
denied.
However, in 1989, the U.S. District Court of Delaware in Scripps
91
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Baxter Travenol Laboratories, Inc.
analyzed the same patent on similar facts, but came to a different
92
Baxter had submitted clinical data that it had
conclusion.
gathered not only to the FDA, but also to foreign regulatory
93
agencies.
Scripps moved to strike Baxter’s § 271(e)(1) defense
on the basis that Baxter’s use was not solely for submission of data
94
to the FDA. Although the court denied the motion because it felt
that the case needed a more developed record, it also stated that
“[t]he question of law . . . is whether any foreign activities can be
95
‘reasonably related’ to FDA drug approval.” The court focused on
the “reasonably related” language of § 271(e)(1), whereas Scripps v.

88. 666 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Cal. 1987), modified on other grounds, 678 F. Supp.
1429 (N.D. Cal. 1988) and 707 F. Supp. 1547 (N.D. Cal. 1989), aff’d in part, rev’d in
part, vacated in part, and remanded on other grounds, 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
89. Id. at 1396.
90. Id. The court states, “Even if the uses . . . were reasonably related to
meeting FDA requirements, they certainly were not solely related to that
purpose . . . . [Genentech’s] sales and uses of [the patented drug], serving
multiple purposes unrelated to meeting FDA requirements, clearly lie beyond the
protection of § 271(e)(1).”
91. 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1562 (D. Del. 1989).
92. Id. at 1565.
93. Id. at 1564-65.
94. Id. Scripps put forth multiple arguments against Baxter’s FDA approval
safe harbor defense, including that 1) Baxter had made a motion on the defense
earlier and withdrew the motion, thus eliminating the defense; 2) Baxter had
distinguished the defense from “the merits” of the case, thus eliminating the
defense; 3) a similar defense was dismissed by the District Court for the Northern
District of California in an unrelated case; and 4) Baxter had filed for regulatory
approval in foreign countries, and thus the uses were not solely for FDA approval.
The court summarily dismissed all of Scripp’s arguments except for the foreign
use argument. Id.
95. Id. at 1565.
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Genentech had focused on “solely” just two years before. As will be
seen, subsequent decisions also seem to agree with the District
Court of Delaware’s focus on the “reasonably related” language.
5. Expanding the Safe Harbor Provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
Many of the subsequent cases applying § 271(e)(1) involve
determining just how far the safe harbor should extend. In 1990,
the scope of § 271(e)(1) was greatly expanded when the Supreme
97
Court held in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc. that the exemption
98
should also apply to medical devices that require FDA approval.
99
The Court held in a 6-2 decision that “[t]he phrase ‘patented
invention’ in § 271(e)(1) is defined to include all inventions, not
100
drug-related inventions alone.” The court also held that not only
does the Hatch-Waxman Act apply to drugs and medical devices,
but rationally to any product requiring regulatory approval under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), which also
101
includes food additives and color additives.
The Supreme Court
reasoned that Congress would have logically intended the safe
harbor provision to include other products requiring FDA
approval, as those other products would encounter the same
distortions at the beginning and end of the patent term due to the
102
FDA approval process.
In 1991, the Northern District of California broadly construed
103
§ 271(e)(1) when it held in Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc. that
96. See id. The court noted the Scripps v. Genentech decision and its focus on
the term “solely” but was disinclined to follow that rule, stating:
Judge Schwarzer of the Northern District of California dismissed a
similar defense raised by Genentech, Inc., based on similar facts, in
another patent infringement suit brought by Scripps Clinic. Scripps
Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech, Inc., 666 F. Supp. 1379,
1395-97 (N.D. Cal. 1987). It argues that this proves that Baxter’s
defense [§ 271(e)(1)] is insufficient. That case, however, is not
controlling in this Court . . . . Judge Schwarzer was faced with this issue,
but he interpreted the statute to only cover activities that were “solely
related” to FDA approval and did not consider what acts are
“reasonably related” to it.
Id. at 1564-65.
97. 496 U.S. 661 (1990).
98. Id. at 673-74.
99. Justice O’Connor took no part in the case. Id. at 661.
100. Id. at 665.
101. Id. at 671-72.
102. Id. at 668-69.
103. 775 F. Supp. 1269 (N.D. Cal. 1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
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activities by the non-patentee Ventritex were “reasonably related”
104
Ventritex’s activities included:
to gaining FDA approval.
demonstrating the device at medical/scientific conferences or
trade shows to solicit clinical investigators, relying on descriptions
of the device to raise capital, publishing articles about the device,
and using data gathered from clinical trials to gain import approval
105
from foreign governments.
The court held that although these
activities did not directly create data for gaining FDA approval, the
activities were necessary to promote Ventritex’s business in its quest
for FDA approval and thus were reasonably related to gaining FDA
106
approval.
Many of Ventritex’s activities did not involve making, using, or
selling the patented device, so they were not technically infringing
107
acts.
Furthermore, the court held that these non-infringing
activities, although commercial in nature and not related to FDA
approval, did not eliminate the safe harbor provision for
Ventritex’s other infringing activities that were reasonably related to
(non-precedential).
104. Id. at 1289.
105. Id. at 1281.
106. Id. The district court also noted that Congress, in enacting § 271(e)(1),
not only wanted generic manufacturers to gain FDA approval before the patent
expired, but also likely intended the companies to “engage in a range of business
activities (like raising capital, establishing mechanisms for product distribution,
etc.)” so they could “enter the commercial market in a significant way immediately
after a patent expired . . . .” Id. at 1278.
107. Id. at 1281. The court states that:
[O]ur inquiry should be confined to “uses” that would be infringing
but for the exemption, these collateral, non-infringing, activities are
not relevant . . . . [T]he use of clinical data, in a prospectus or
otherwise, is not an infringing act . . . Moreover, the fact that this noninfringing activity reveals a commercial “purpose” unrelated to
obtaining FDA approval cannot provide a basis for denial of the
exemption . . . . [T]hese activities are important means for Ventritex to
position itself to enter the marketplace if the Cadence ever receives
FDA approval.
Id. (emphasis added).
The court also states: “the exemption . . . is not lost simply as a result of a showing
that the defendant has engaged in non-infringing acts whose ‘uses’ fall outside
those permitted by the statute.” Id. at 1278 (emphasis in original). See also
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1523-24 (Fed. Cir.
1992) (stating that demonstrations of a patented medical device at medical
conferences for purposes of soliciting clinical trial candidates are exempt under §
271(e)(1) and also stating that incidental non-infringing activities such as
reporting clinical trial progress to doctors, investors, analysts, journalists, and
other non-FDA officials are not relevant to a determination of exemption under
the safe harbor of § 271(e)(1)).
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108

seeking FDA approval.
The Intermedics court also distinguished between objective
“uses” of a patented product and subjective “purposes” behind the
109
use in interpreting § 271(e)(1). The court needed to determine
when a defendant’s use was “reasonably related” to seeking FDA
approval. The patent owner contended that the court must analyze
110
the purpose of the infringer’s activities.
But the court held that
111
The court
Congress intended an objective test for § 271(e)(1).
then created an objective test to determine what acts are
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval, and ignored the
112
defendant’s subjective intent.
The Intermedics court found that sales of otherwise-infringing
devices to hospitals for use in clinical trials were exempt under
§ 271(e)(1) because the hospitals were using the devices to collect
113
data for the FDA.
The court also held that when Ventritex
continued to sell devices to hospitals even after the application had
already been submitted to the FDA, these sales were still exempt
because Ventritex reasonably believed the FDA might withhold
approval, in which case additional data from continued sales would
114
Thus, continued clinical trials were objectively
be necessary.
108. See Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1277-78.
109. Id. at 1278.
110. Id. The patentee argued that although the use by the defendant might be
reasonably related to seeking FDA approval, the true purpose or intent behind the
defendant’s activities was to engage in conduct “beyond generating and
presenting data to the FDA,” and therefore the conduct infringed the patents. Id.
111. Id. at 1278-80 (basing its holding on statutory language, probable
congressional intent, the trend away from subjective tests, the difficulty of applying
a subjective test, and the irrationality of applying a subjective test). The court
states it should focus on:
[T]hose acts by Ventritex which would be deemed “infringing” but for
§ 271(e)(1) and in which Ventritex actually has engaged (as opposed
to the acts in which the company might engage in the future). With
respect to those actual acts, we do not ask what underlying motives
might have inspired them or what indirect, ripple effects . . . they
might bring.
Id. at 1280.
112. See id. at 1278-79. The court formulated its test by stating: “[W]e should
ask: would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in defendant’s situation
to believe that there was a decent prospect that the ‘use’ in question would
contribute (relatively directly) to the generation of kinds of information that was
likely to be relevant [for FDA approval].” Id. at 1280.
113. Id. at 1282. The devices must be sold at cost to the persons performing
the clinical trials. Id.
114. Id. (“[E]ven after being accepted for filing, a substantial number of
applications for pre-market approval are provisionally rejected because the FDA
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115

“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval.
The Intermedics decision broadened the safe harbor of §
271(e)(1) by allowing commercial, non-infringing uses even
though unrelated to FDA approval while also defining “solely for
uses reasonably related” to FDA approval as an objective analysis of
116
the activity rather than the subjective purpose behind the use.
Other courts have followed the Intermedics two-part test or inquiry
117
The court first determines whether the
to apply § 271(e)(1).
activity at issue is an infringing one under § 271(a); and if so,
118
whether the § 271(e)(1) exemption applies to that activity.
The
Federal Circuit adopted the Intermedics test in Telectronics Pacing
119
Systems, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc.
The Telectronics court held that
demonstration of a medical device to physicians and non-physicians
120
was necessary to obtain clinical investigators. It further held that
non-infringing activities that fell outside the statutory exemption
were irrelevant, such as using the data collected to do fundraising
121
and other activities to prepare to enter the market.
Even the making and stockpiling of drugs by a non-patent
owner has been found to be exempt from infringement as long as
122
reasonably related to FDA approval.
In NeoRX v. Immunomedics,
Inc., the court held that production of large, commercial-scale
batches of a drug by a non-patentee were exempt from

concludes that [more information is needed].” The court concludes, “it is
reasonable to continue to generate clinical data after submitting an initial [FDA
approval] application”). Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1280-81.
117. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d 104,
107 (D. Mass. 1998) (“First, § 271 applies generally only to activities that might
constitute infringement . . . . Second, the potentially infringing activity must be
‘solely for uses’ related to FDA approval.”); NeoRX Corp. v. Immunomedics, Inc.,
877 F. Supp. 202, 206 (D. N.J. 1994).
118. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d at 107; NeoRX, Corp., 887 F. Supp. at
206.
119. 982 F.2d 1520, 1525 n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1992); see also Amgen, Inc., 3 F. Supp. 2d
at 108; Abtox, Inc. v. Exitron Corp., 888 F. Supp. 6, 8 (D. Mass. 1995), aff’d, 122
F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 1997); NeoRX, Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 205.
120. 982 F.2d at 1525.
121. Id. The court added: “To adopt [the patentee’s] interpretation we would
have to read into [§ 271(e)(1)] an unspoken requirement that the disclosure of
information obtained during clinical trials to persons other than FDA officials,
although not itself an act of infringement, somehow “repeals” the exemption. We
do not find that requirement in the words of the statute.” Id. at 1524.
122. See NeoRX, Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 206-07 (finding that other activities by
Immunomedics were infringing and not exempt).
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infringement regardless of the need for them because the FDA
required proof that the manufacturer could make commercial
123
124
quantities.
However, in Biogen, Inc. v. Schering AG, Biogen’s
excessive stockpiling was found to be in preparation of future sales
125
rather than to satisfy an FDA requirement. Even though the FDA
had not yet approved Biogen’s generic version, the court held that
the stockpiling was not reasonably related to FDA approval and
126
thus not exempt. Courts appear willing to extend § 271(e)(1) to
the limits of seeking FDA approval but not to activities that are
clearly infringing and wholly unnecessary for FDA approval.
127
In Amgen, Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., the court held
that use of a patented drug as a reference standard for multiple
experimental manufacturing processes was reasonably related to
128
seeking FDA approval.
Hoechst was seeking FDA approval on a
first manufacturing process for erythropoietin (EPO), a drug
129
patented by Amgen.
Hoechst used EPO, made using its first
process, as a reference standard for a second experimental
manufacturing process for which Hoechst had not yet begun
130
seeking FDA approval.
Amgen sued Hoechst, claiming that
Hoechst’s use of EPO as a reference standard for the second
manufacturing process was infringement because it had not yet
131
begun to seek FDA approval for that process. The court held that
Hoechst’s use of the reference standard was exempt from
infringement because Hoechst would seek FDA approval on the
132
second process in the future.
Thus, the court interpreted §
123. Id.
124. 954 F. Supp. 391 (D. Mass. 1996).
125. Id. at 396-97. “Biogen had done far more than merely do clinical trials for
submission to the FDA, it had spent $24 million to stockpile and prepare to
market Avonex immediately upon the anticipated, imminent FDA approval . . . .
These actions took Biogen out of the ‘safe harbor’. . . .” Id.
126. Id.
127. 3 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 1998).
128. Id. at 109.
129. See id. at 108-09.
130. Id. at 109.
131. Id. The EPO used by Hoechst was manufactured in New Hampshire by
an independent contractor. One batch of this EPO was sent to Japan to use as a
reference standard where a Japanese affiliate was working on an alternative
manufacturing process. The EPO sent to Japan would presumably be used to
compare to the output of the new process to ensure that the new process worked
properly. Id.
132. Id. The court further stated:
There is no question but that an alternative manufacturing process
would require separate FDA approval. Moreover, the FDA guidelines
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271(e)(1) as allowing otherwise infringing activities in anticipation
of future requests for FDA approval.
In general, courts interpret § 271(e)(1) broadly. Various
courts have held that nearly any product requiring FDA approval is
exempt from infringement so that other manufacturers can seek
133
FDA approval before the patent term expires.
Courts also have
decided that the infringer’s subjective intent should not be
analyzed, but rather, if the otherwise-infringing activities can be
134
objectively related to seeking FDA approval, they are exempt.
Furthermore, courts have broadly interpreted the term “reasonably
related” to include many activities that will benefit the
manufacturer once the patent term expires, such as marketing
activities or producing commercial-sized batches of drugs, as long
as the activities can be reasonably related back to seeking FDA
135
approval.
Non-infringing activities that have a commercial
purpose such as fundraising, soliciting investors, and other
activities necessary to enter the market effectively, are held to be
136
irrelevant and to not affect the FDA approval safe harbor. Courts
have generally relied on § 271(e)(1)’s strong public policy of
providing cheaper generic drugs as soon as possible after the
137
patent expires.
However, Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck
138
KGaA shows that the Federal Circuit is unwilling to overextend
either the FDA approval safe harbor provision or the experimental
use exemption in the name of public good.

contemplate the use of a reference standard sample from one
manufacturing process to evaluate the effects of alterations in that
process. The Defendants’ efforts to evaluate that process were
therefore within the class of activities protected by the statute,
regardless of whether they had sought FDA approval at the time.
Id. (citations omitted).
133. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 668-69, 672 (1990).
134. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-80 (N.D. Cal.
1991), aff’d, 991 F.2d 808 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (non-precedential).
135. See, e.g., id. at 1278; NeoRX Corp., 877 F. Supp. at 206-07 (D. N.J. 1994).
136. See Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1280; Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc. v.
Ventritex, Inc., 982 F.2d 1520, 1524-25 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
137. See, e.g., Intermedics, Inc., 775 F. Supp. at 1276-77.
138. 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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139

A. Background
Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. (Integra) owns several patents
140
related to the RGD peptide. RGD is a short segment of a protein
having the amino acid sequence Arginine-Glycine-Aspartic Acid
141
(“Arg-Gly-Asp” or “RGD”).
The RGD peptide was found to
promote cell adhesion to substrates, as well as blood vessel
142
growth.
In theory, the RGD peptide can be used to encourage
wound healing as well as improve biocompatibility of prosthetic
143
devices. The RGD peptide works by attaching to v 3 receptors on
144
cell surface proteins called integrins.
Dr. David Cheresh, a scientist and professor at The Scripps
Research Institute (Scripps), discovered that blocking the v 3
145
receptors inhibits the formation of new blood vessels. Inhibiting
new blood vessel growth appeared promising as a means of halting
tumor growth, and was, therefore, a possible candidate for
146
treatment of cancer.
Dr. Cheresh believed that Integra’s RGD147
Dr. Cheresh’s work
peptide might be useful in this respect.
involved the use of cyclic RGD-containing peptides, rather than
148
Integra’s linear peptides.
Merck also realized the importance of
139. Id.
140. Id. at 862. The patents owned by Integra relating to the RGD peptide are
U.S. Patent Nos. 4,792,525 (the ’525 patent), 4,988,621 (the ’621 patent),
4,789,734 (the ’734 patent), 4,879,237 (the ’237 patent), and 5,695,997 (the ’997
patent). Id. The RGD peptides were originally invented and patented by Integra’s
co-plaintiff Telios Pharmaceuticals, Inc. Id. at 873. Telios failed to develop a
commercially viable product and later sold its patents to Integra. Id.
141. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1846,
1847 (S.D. Cal. 1999).
142. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863, 873.
143. Id. at 863.
144. Id. at 862.
145. Id. at 863. The process of forming new blood vessels is known
scientifically as angiogenesis. Id.
146. Id. at 863, 874. New blood vessel formation is essential to feed the growth
of a tumor, so stopping blood vessel formation could inhibit further tumor
growth. Id. In addition to anti-tumor potential, the anti-angiogenic therapies
could theoretically also treat diabetic retinopathy, rheumatoid arthritis, psoriasis,
macular degeneration, and inflammatory bowel disease, among other medical
maladies. Id.
147. Id. at 863.
148. Id. at 873-74 (stating that “the cyclic peptide structure [used by Cheresh]
solved certain problems that had been experienced with the Telios linear RGD
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Dr. Cheresh’s work and in 1988 offered to fund further research by
149
In return for the funding, Scripps
Dr. Cheresh and Scripps.
granted Merck an option to license any future inventions derived
150
from the work. The Merck-Scripps research effort continued
151
In 1997, Dr. Cheresh’s research team
through the late 1990s.
chose the best new drug candidate to begin developing data for
152
submission to the FDA.
Integra found out about the Scripps-Merck research and,
“[b]elieving the angiogenesis research was a commercial project
that infringed its RGD-related patents,” Integra offered Merck a
153
Merck declined to take a
license to use the RGD technology.
license from Integra, and Integra filed a patent infringement suit
154
against Merck, Scripps, and Dr. Cheresh.
B. Holding
1. Majority Opinion
At the trial in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of California, the jury found that Merck infringed Integra’s patents
155
and awarded Integra $15 million as a reasonable royalty.
Although the district court found that one of Integra’s patents,
156
Patent No. 4,988,621, was invalid due to prior art, the jury held
peptides . . . .”).
149. Id.; see also Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
150. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1847.
151. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 873.
152. Id. at 863. The drug candidate chosen by the Scripps research team was a
cyclic RGD peptide identified as EMD 121974. Id. The researchers had three
possible drug candidates—EMD 66203, EMD 85189, and EMD 121974—and
performed several different in vivo and in vitro tests on each one to determine the
“histopathology, toxicology, circulation, diffusion, and half-life of the peptides in
the bloodstream. These tests also examined the proper mode of administering
the peptides for optimum therapeutic effect.” Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 862.
156. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1848. Defendant Merck
moved for summary judgment of invalidity of Claim 2 of the ’621 patent. The
judge found in favor of Merck on the motion and held that plaintiff’s own article,
entitled Cell Attachment Activity of Fibronectin can be Duplicated by Small Synthetic
Fragments of the Molecule, 309 NATURE 30, 30-33 (May 3, 1984), was prior art with
respect to Claim 2 of Integra’s ’621 patent under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b). Section 102
states that the inventor “shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . (b) the invention
was patented or described in a printed publication . . . more than one year prior to
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157

that Integra’s four other patents were valid and infringed.
The
district court held that Merck’s infringing activities did not fall
158
within the safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1).
On appeal, the Federal Circuit in a panel consisting of Circuit
Judges Rader, Prost, and Newman affirmed that Merck infringed
159
Integra’s patents. In a 2-1 decision, Judges Rader and Prost held
that neither the common-law experimental use exemption nor the
statutory safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1) applied to Merck’s
160
activities.
The majority held that even though Merck’s activities
might eventually lead to a product that requires FDA approval, the
research activities leading up to that point are not within the safe
161
harbor. The court stated:
[T]he Scripps work sponsored by Merck was not clinical
testing to supply information to the FDA, but only general
biomedical research to identify new pharmaceutical
compounds. The FDA has no interest in the hunt for
drugs that may or may not later undergo clinical testing
162
for FDA approval.
The court focused on the purpose of the FDA approval safe
harbor provision, noting that “the express objective of the 1984
[Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration] Act was to
facilitate the immediate entry of safe, effective generic drugs into
163
the marketplace upon expiration of a pioneer drug patent.”
Although the language of § 271(e)(1) broadly permits
164
the majority
activities “reasonably related” to FDA approval,
clearly refused to “expand the phrase ‘reasonably related’ to
embrace the development of new drugs [simply] because those
the date of the application for patent . . . .” 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2003). The Nature
article was published one year and three weeks before the effective filing date of
the patent application. 50 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1848-49.
157. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863 (finding “Merck liable for
infringing the ’525, ’997, ’237, and ’734 patents”).
158. Id. at 862.
159. Id. While upholding the district court’s finding of infringement, it
remanded the reasonable royalty award because the award of $15 million was not
supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. at 870-71.
160. Id. at 872.
161. Id. at 865-66.
162. Id. at 866.
163. Id. at 866-67. The court stated “[t]he focus of the entire exemption is the
provision of information to the FDA. Activities that do not directly produce
information for the FDA are already straining the relationship to the central
purpose of the safe harbor.” Id. at 866.
164. See supra Part II.B.
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165

new products will also need FDA approval.”
The court believed
such an expansion would “exonerate infringing uses only
potentially related to information for FDA approval” and “would
effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees owning
166
biotechnology tool patents.”
2. Judge Newman’s Dissenting Opinion
Judge Newman dissented in part from the majority in this case
because she felt that the common-law experimental use exemption
should apply to Merck’s research activities and use of the RGD
167
The majority refused to consider the common-law
peptide.
experimental use exemption, stating that the experimental use
exemption was not an issue presented to the jury and consequently
168
could not be properly considered on appeal.
The majority
further stated in dictum that even if the experimental use
exemption were before the court on appeal, the exemption
165. 331 F.3d at 867 (stating § 271(e)(1) “simply does not globally embrace all
experimental activity that at some point, however attenuated, may lead to an FDA
approval process”).
166. Id. In stating that expanding the FDA approval would effectively
eliminate biotechnology tool patents, the court is referring to inventions that can
be used as research tools. The court’s fear is that expanding the § 271(e)(1) safe
harbor would allow drug researchers to use another’s patented research tool to
perform experiments without recourse as long as the use of the research tool
relates to a product requiring FDA approval. The National Institutes of Health
(NIH) defines research tools to be “tools that scientists use in the laboratory,
including cell lines, monoclonal antibodies, reagents, animal models, growth
factors, combinatorial chemistry and DNA libraries, clones and cloning tools (such
as PRC), methods, laboratory equipment and machines.” Id. at 87-721 n.4
(quoting Sharing Biomedical Research Resources: Principles and Guidelines for
Recipients of NIH Research Grants and Contracts, 64 Fed. Reg. 72,090, 72,092 n.1
(Dec. 23, 1999)).
167. Id. at 872 (Newman, J., dissenting).
168. Id. at 864 n.2. The majority opinion states in footnote 2 that:
[T]he common law experimental use exception is not before the court
in the instant case. The issue before the jury was whether the
infringing pre-clinical experiments are immunized from liability via the
“FDA exemption,” i.e., 35 U.S.C. 271(e)(1). The district court did not
instruct the jury on the common law [experimental use] exemption
with respect to the Merck’s infringing activities.
Id.
The court’s footnote goes on to explain that on appeal, Merck did not attempt to
argue that the experimental use exemption applies to its activities. Counsel for
Merck expressly stated during oral arguments that the common law experimental
use exemption was irrelevant. The majority chastises Judge Newman’s dissent and
the fact that Judge Newman believes that the common law experimental use
exemption should apply to Merck’s activities. Id.
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probably would not apply, as the majority believed that the
doctrine was better suited to cases of de minimis infringement and
169
minimal damages. However, Judge Newman’s dissent noted that
the district court did in fact apply the common law doctrine to one
Scripps experiment conducted in 1994, but did not apply the
170
exemption to any of the other experiments.
Judge Newman
argued that the issue was accordingly before the district court and
171
could be properly considered on appeal.
Judge Newman believed the common-law experimental use
exemption should apply to the type of research performed by
172
Merck/Scripps for a number of reasons.
First, the requirement
that the patent fully discloses the invention has the very purpose of
allowing others to study, improve upon, and reverse-engineer the
173
patented invention.
Full disclosure would serve no purpose
whatsoever if the information cannot be used during the term of
174
the patent.
Second, the routine and rapid appearance of improvements
on patented subject matter, without a corresponding infringement
suit by the patent owner, is proof that the patent system allows the
use of the information contained in the patent to conduct research
175
and develop new products.
Judge Newman argued that the
current rate of technological advancement is due in large part to
the knowledge gleaned from patented inventions; if the patentee
were allowed to prohibit such research, then the advancement of
176
technology in the patentee’s field would stop.
Third, Judge Newman disagreed with the majority’s
177
characterization of Integra’s patent as a “research tool.”
The
169. Id.
170. Id. at 878. Judge Newman also noted that on appeal Merck’s counsel
“explained at oral argument that they were not pressing this argument ‘in part
because of a very recent case.’ ” Id.
171. See id.
172. Id. at 875.
173. Id. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
174. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 875. Judge Newman noted that the
requirement of disclosing “details of enabling experiments and technical drawings
and best modes and preferred embodiments . . . would be idle and purposeless if
this information cannot be used [by others] for 17-20 years.” Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. Judge Newman broadly argued that “the first patentee in the field
could bar not only patent-protected competition, but all research that might lead
to such competition, as well as barring improvement or challenge or avoidance of
patented technology.” Id.
177. Id. at 877-78. See also id. at 871-72 (majority opinion).
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majority’s argument that allowing the experimental use exemption
to apply to the use of a research tool patent to conduct other
research would effectively eliminate the usefulness of the patent is
178
correct.
However, Judge Newman characterized the RGD
peptides not as research tools, but “simply new compositions
179
having certain biological properties.”
Finally, Judge Newman believed that even if the researcher’s
ultimate goal is to commercialize a product, the experimental use
180
exemption should still apply to pre-commercialization research.
She reasoned that patent law barred development and
commercialization, but not the research itself that led to
181
commercialization.
However, Judge Newman did not define the
182
crossover point between research and development.
Even though Judge Newman did not define where research
ends and development and commercialization begin, she
rationalized that for a product requiring FDA approval the
development and commercialization aspects were covered by the
FDA approval safe harbor provision of § 271(e)(1) because the
development and commercialization would necessarily involve
183
gathering and submitting data to the FDA. Any period of use not
178. See id. at 867 (stating that “expansion of § 271(e)(1) to include the
Scripps/Merck activities would effectively vitiate the exclusive rights of patentees
owning biotechnology tool patents . . . exaggerating § 271(e)(1) would [eliminate
all patent protection] for some categories of biotechnological inventions”).
179. Id. at 878.
180. Id. at 876 (stating that “an ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful
research should not eliminate the exemption. The better rule is to recognize the
exemption for research conducted in order to understand or improve upon or
modify the patented subject matter, whatever the ultimate goal”).
181. Id. Judge Newman stated: “That is how the patent system has always
worked: the patent is infringed by and bars activity associated with development
and commercialization of infringing subject matter, but the research itself is not
prohibited, nor is comparison of the patented subject matter with improved
technology or with designs whose purpose is to avoid the patent.” Id.
182. See id. at 876-77.
183. See id. Judge Newman stated:
[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from
laboratory experimentation to development of data for submission to
the FDA, was either exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by
§ 271(e)(1). It would be strange to create an intervening kind of
limbo, between exploratory research subject to exemption, and the
FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed and the activity
can be prohibited . . . . [T]he law does not favor such an illogical
outcome.
Id. at 877.
Thus rather than defining a point where the experimental use exemption ends,
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exempt from infringement by the research exception would be
184
Hence, the entire
covered by the FDA approval safe harbor.
Scripps/Merck pursuit would be exempt from infringement—the
first portions under the experimental use exemption, and the latter
185
under the FDA approval safe harbor.
However, once the FDA
approval was gained and the safe harbor provision is no longer
applicable, then the full force of any valid patent would be in effect
186
to prevent sales of the infringing products.
Judge Newman further disagreed with the majority’s analysis of
187
the reasonable royalty calculation.
She believed the standard to
be looser than the majority made it out to be, and the exact date of
the hypothetical negotiation was not as important as the majority
188
held.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. The FDA Approval Safe Harbor Provision—35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)
The Integra court correctly construed § 271(e)(1) and correctly
189
Merck’s research
applied it to Merck’s research activities.
activities do not fall within the purpose of the statute. The court
could have concluded that since Merck’s research eventually would
lead to a product requiring FDA approval, the research must be
“reasonably related” to FDA approval. The court properly uses the
original purpose behind the statute to reject this overly broad
interpretation.
When Congress enacted § 271(e)(1) as part of the Drug Price
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, the intent
was clearly to allow a generic drug manufacturer the latitude to

Judge Newman stated that where the experimental use exemption ends, the FDA
approval safe harbor begins and no further analysis is necessary. See id.
184. See id. at 876-77.
185. See id.
186. See id. at 877.
187. Id.
188. Id. Judge Newman’s dissent stated that “[t]he ‘hypothetical negotiation’
is no more than a convenience in estimating value, not a compulsory economic
standard, and surely not one that requires appellate speculation as to when the
parties might have hypothetically negotiated.” Id. Judge Newman believed that, in
the case that Merck has been found to be an infringer, the jury’s award was “well
supported” by “extensive” evidence on damages. Id.
189. See id. at 867-68; 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) (2000).
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gain pre-approval on a similar generic form of a patented drug.
The purpose of the statute was to make generic forms of a patented
191
drug available to the public as soon as a patent expired. Merck’s
research activities do not fall within this purpose. Merck was
attempting to create an entirely new product using Integra’s
patented RGD peptide as only a starting point, rather than gaining
FDA approval on a generic version of Integra’s product for sale
192
upon expiration of the patent.
Even if the Federal Circuit had applied the broad Intermedics
test, the court still should not have held Merck’s activities to fall
within the FDA approval safe harbor provision. The Intermedics test
asks, “would it have been reasonable, objectively, for a party in
defendant’s situation to believe that there was a decent prospect
that the ‘use’ in question would contribute (relatively directly) to
the generation of kinds of information that was likely to be relevant
193
[to FDA approval]?”
Although this rule uses broad language
such as “reasonable,” “decent prospect,” and “kinds of
information . . . likely to be relevant,” Merck’s uses still fall outside
it. Merck’s uses cannot be said to have contributed relatively directly
to the generation of information relevant to FDA approval.
Merck’s activities were not meant to create data for FDA approval
on an existing Integra product, but rather were intended to
discover a different product worthy of submitting to the FDA.
Merck’s activity is so far beyond the clear purpose set forth by
Congress that interpreting its actions as falling within the safe
harbor provision would defeat Congress’ intent.
Even Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra admits “that ‘the
§ 271(e)(1) safe harbor [does not] reach back down the chain of
experimentation to embrace development and identification of
194
new drugs.’ ” Judge Newman agreed that the initial research and
development should not be exempted from infringement by the
195
However, Judge Newman did believe
FDA approval safe harbor.
190. See supra Part II.B.
191. See Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661, 670 (1990). The
Supreme Court stated, “[s]ince [FDA approval] could not be commenced by those
who planned to compete with the patentee until expiration of the entire patent
term, the patentee’s de facto monopoly would continue for an often substantial
period . . . The 1984 Act sought to eliminate this distortion . . . .” Id.
192. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 862-63.
193. Intermedics, Inc. v. Ventritex, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 1269, 1280 (N.D. Cal.
1991).
194. See 331 F.3d at 877 (quoting the majority opinion at 865-66).
195. Id.
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that once Merck had chosen a drug to submit to the FDA, then
those activities thereafter would be exempt under the FDA
approval safe harbor. But more importantly, Judge Newman
thought that Merck’s initial research should have been exempted
under the common-law experimental use exemption, whereas the
196
majority refused such a finding.
B. Common-Law Experimental Use Exemption
The Integra majority properly applied the common-law
experimental use exemption as developed by previous case law.
However, the experimental use exemption as it now stands is too
narrow and should be broadened to apply to research activities
such as Merck’s. Thus, the majority’s decision in Integra is
erroneous when considered from the perspective of a broader
experimental use exemption. Judge Newman’s dissent correctly
broadens the experimental use exemption and applies it to Merck’s
research.
The majority and dissent in the Integra case are diametrically
opposed as to the application of the common-law experimental use
exemption. It should be noted again that the majority did not
analyze or apply the experimental use exemption. They concluded
that the trial court did not hear the issue, the jury did not decide
197
the issue, and thus the issue was not ripe for appeal.
However,
even if they had considered the experimental use exemption issue,
198
they would not have allowed it as a defense for Merck’s activities.
In dicta, the court stated, “the Patent Act does not include the word
‘experimental,’ let alone an experimental use exemption from
199
infringement.”
The majority, or at least Judge Rader, believed
the experimental use exemption is not necessary and should be
eliminated. Judge Rader has expressly stated so at least once
before in his concurring opinion in Embrex, Inc. v. Service
200
Engineering Corp. Judge Rader is correct that the Patent Act does
not explicitly call for an experimental use exemption. However,
196. Id. at 874-76; see supra Part II.B.; infra Part IV.B.
197. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 864 n.2.
198. See id.
199. Id. The court also stated in dicta that “the judge-made [experimental
use] doctrine is rooted in the notions of de minimis infringement better addressed
by limited damages.” Id.
200. 216 F.3d 1343, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (Rader, J., concurring) (stating “the
Patent Act leaves no room for any de minimis or experimental use excuses for
infringement”).
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the lack of statutory language on the subject does not inescapably
mean that a common-law experimental use exemption serves no
purpose or is unnecessary.
As Judge Newman noted in her dissent, the requirement of full
disclosure of the invention in the patent seems to presuppose the
right of the public to use this information. In addition, patents
provide a monopoly that is intended to spur innovation by giving
the patentee a reward. The patent monopoly need only be
extended far enough to continue to spur innovation, and need not
monopolize the right to do research on as well as commercialize a
patented invention.
1. Full Disclosure Argument in Favor of an Experimental Use
Exemption
a. The Full Disclosure Rule
A fundamental exchange of rights occurs in the patent system.
The inventor agrees to give the public a full disclosure of the
invention in exchange for a government-sanctioned monopoly for
201
twenty years.
As Judge Newman noted in her Integra dissent,
“[t]he patent statute requires full disclosure of the invention,
including details of enabling experiments and technical drawings
and best modes and preferred embodiments, even commercial
202
sources of special components.” The patent system also requires
203
that the documents be accessible to the public.
The Patent Act
201. See 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003) (requiring the patent contain a specification
describing the patented invention in “full, clear, concise, and exact terms”); 35
U.S.C. § 154 (2003) (granting patent rights for twenty years from the filing date of
the patent application).
202. 331 F.3d at 875. See also 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003). Section 112 states that
the patent specification must include:
[A] written description of the invention, and of the manner and
process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the
same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor
of carrying out his invention.
Id.
203. See United States Patent and Trademark Office Editorial Standards,
available at http://www.uspto.gov/main/ccpubguide.htm (last visited March 24,
2004). The USPTO web site states:
Patents are published into the public domain as part of the terms of
granting the patent to the inventor. As such, they are not subject to
copyright restrictions. The inventors’ right to exclude others from
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention . . . is not
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even allows for patent applications to become publicly available
eighteen months after the filing date, consequently facilitating full
public disclosure of the invention, even before a patent has
204
issued.
The patent application and patent itself must contain a
description of the patented invention, as well as how to make and
use it, in “full, clear, concise and exact” details such that “any
205
person skilled in the art” could make and use it. The patent must
also include what the inventor considers to be the “best mode” of
206
the invention.
Thus, the patentee gives up the right to secrecy
and makes a full disclosure of the invention to the public in order
to gain the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling
207
the invention.
Judge Newman believed that prohibiting all research on
patented subject matter is both “impractical” and “incorrect” as
208
patents are a major source of scientific knowledge.
While
discussing the full disclosure rule, Judge Newman stated, “such
details would be idle and purposeless if this information cannot be
209
used for 17-20 years.”
This argument makes sense. What
compromised by the publication of the description of the invention.
In other words, the fact that a patent’s description is in the public
domain does not give you permission to manufacture or use the
invention without permission from the inventor during the active life
of the patent.
Id.; see also 35 U.S.C. § 2(a)(2) (2003) (stating that the USPTO “shall be
responsible for disseminating to the public information with respect to patents
and trademarks”). See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 9, 10, 12 (2003) (allowing for different
methods of making patents available to the public).
204. See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2003) (stating that, with a few exceptions
under § 122(b)(2), “each application for a patent shall be published . . . promptly
after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the earliest filing date . . . .”
The exceptions include when the application is: 1) no longer pending; 2) subject
to a secrecy order under § 181; 3) a provisional application filed under § 111(b);
4) an application for a design patent; or 5) the invention has not and will not be
the subject of a patent application in a foreign country and the applicant requests
that the application not be published).
205. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
206. Id.
207. See, e.g., Amgen, Inc. v. Genetics Inst., Inc., 877 F. Supp. 45, 52 (D. Mass.
1995) (“From the early days of the republic, our patent law has required that in
exchange for a government-sanctioned monopoly on the rights to an invention or
discovery, the inventor must teach the world the secret behind the method or
device”); see also 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2003) (stating “whoever without authority
makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . infringes the patent”
thus giving the patent holder the right to sue the infringers for damages, an
injunction, or both).
208. 331 F.3d at 875.
209. Id.
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purpose does the full disclosure rule have if the public cannot
build and improve upon this knowledge? If the patent system does
not want the public to utilize the information until after the patent
expires, then patents should not be published and made available,
210
but instead be kept secret until expiration.
If the patentee is to
have complete supremacy over the information in the patent, then
it would be much easier for the patentee to secure and enforce
those rights if the patent is not disclosed to the public. The
patentee could more easily exclude others from making, using,
selling, and researching the patented subject matter if the patent was
211
not publicly disclosed.
One could argue that a broader experimental use exemption
would encourage an inventor to make an incomplete disclosure of
the invention in the patent, revealing as little as possible to prevent
212
researchers from effectively using the disclosure.
However, an
incomplete disclosure would violate 35 U.S.C. § 112, which
requires, 1) a full description of the invention, 2) enablement, and
213
3) the best mode. An inadequate disclosure will cause either the
214
patent examiner to reject the patent application or cause a court
215
In addition, other practitioners in the
to invalidate the patent.

210. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the Norms of Science in
Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 219 (1987) [hereinafter Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights].
If the public had absolutely no right to make, use, or sell the
patented invention until the end of the patent term, it would be
somewhat puzzling to require that the patentee give the public an
enabling disclosure of the invention at the beginning of the patent
term. The requirement of early disclosure suggests that certain uses
of patented inventions during the patent term do not constitute
patent infringement.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Some argue that this incomplete disclosure problem already occurs. See
Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 533-34 (1966); Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17,
at 1029.
213. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2003).
214. See MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.01 (2003); 37 C.F.R. §
1.71(a) (2003).
215. See, e.g., Beidler v. United States, 253 U.S. 447, 453 (1920) (stating that “it
has been consistently held that a correct and adequate description or disclosure of
a claimed discovery . . . is essential to the validity of a patent, for the reason that such a
disclosure is necessary in order to give the public the benefit of the invention after
the patent shall expire”) (emphasis added); Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,
108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (invalidating the plaintiff’s patent for lack of an
enabling disclosure).
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field can examine the disclosure and decide if it is enabling. If it
is not, then the practitioner can infringe the patent with the
knowledge that lack of enablement is a sufficient defense to
217
invalidate the patent.
Therefore, this incomplete disclosure
problem should not dissuade the use of a broader experimental
use exemption.
b. Allowed Uses of the Patent Disclosure
The patent system already seems to acquiesce to the public’s
use of patented information. Improvements on patented subject
matter appear quickly and routinely regardless of whether the
218
It is highly
patentee has licensed the technology to others.
unlikely that all of these improvements come by way of
independent research. Rather, ambitious inventors or researchers
likely study the current state of the art including issued patents and
then improve upon the art. The appearance of improvements to
patented subject matter tends to prove that the public already uses
the patent disclosure to conduct some amount of research and
development.
c. Designing Around a Patented Invention
As further proof that the patent system allows the public to use
the information in the patent, the Federal Circuit has stated on
many occasions that the public is not only able, but encouraged, to
219
“design around” a patented invention.
Designing around a
216. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 210, at 219.
217. Id. Eisenberg states that practitioners in the field may be more able to
discern defect in the patent specification than the patent examiner. Id. “Since an
insufficient disclosure makes the patent invalid and unenforceable, those who
have a use for the patented technology will be motivated to uncover defects in the
specification in order to avoid liability to the patentee.” Id.
218. See generally Beidler, 253 U.S. at 453.
219. See, e.g., State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1235-36
(Fed. Cir. 1985) (stating that “keeping track of a competitor’s products and
designing new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents is the stuff of
which competition is made and is supposed to benefit the consumer. One of the
benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a
competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of
innovations to the marketplace”); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d
1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (stating “designing or inventing around patents to
make new inventions is encouraged” when the party designs around by making a
“substantial change” to the invention.
However, “piracy” by making an
“insubstantial change” is not allowed”); Westvaco Corp. v. Int’l Paper Co., 991 F.2d
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patented invention entails making changes to the invention so that
the new design no longer fits within the scope of the patent’s
220
claims.
The new design may be very similar to the patented
invention and directly compete in the same marketplace against
the invention; but because the new design does not contain all the
221
elements of the patent claim, it is not an infringing product. The
Federal Circuit has stated that designing around a patented
invention is encouraged because it promotes free competition,
222
which benefits the public.
The full disclosure rule effectively
enables competitors to more easily design around a patented
invention.
223
However, in Embrex, Inc. v. Service Engineering Corp., the
Federal Circuit did not allow Service Engineering to infringe
224
Service
Embrex’s patent while attempting to design around it.
Engineering built several machines that were held to still infringe
225
the patents.
The Federal Circuit rejected Service Engineering’s
argument that the machines were for experimental use only to
226
design around the patent.
Even though Service Engineering
never sold any of the machines built, the court held that the use
had a commercial purpose and was not an exempt experimental
227
use.
Apparently, the Federal Circuit encourages designing
around the patent only when an infringing design is not made.
Service Engineering was unsuccessful in building a non-infringing
228
device.
One wonders if Service Engineering would have been
735, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (quoting both State Industries and London with approval);
Slimfold Mfg. Co. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding “[i]ntentional ‘designing around’ the claims of a patent is not by itself a
wrong which must be compensated . . . . Designing around patents is, in fact, one
of the ways in which the patent system works to the advantage of the public in
promoting progress in the useful arts . . . . ”).
220. See Slimfold Mfg., Co., 932 F.2d at 1457.
221. See id. The subtle test of whether the design around has been effective in
avoiding the patent claims involves applying what is known as the “doctrine of
equivalents” to determine whether a “substantial change” has been made to the
product by the alleged infringer. Id.
222. See State Indus., Inc., 751 F.2d at 1235 (“designing around a patented
invention creates “new and possibly better or cheaper functional equivalents . . .
and is supposed to benefit the consumer”); Westvaco Corp., 991 F.2d at 745 (same).
See also Slimfold Mfg., Inc., 932 F.2d at 1457.
223. 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
224. Id. at 1346-47, 1349.
225. Id. at 1349.
226. See id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1346-47.
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liable for infringement if it had successfully designed around the
patent claims.
A patent system that encourages designing around a patented
invention to promote competition seems to contradict a system that
will not allow a competitor to use the patent disclosure to conduct
independent research on a completely different derivative product.
During the process of designing around a patented product, the
competitor is likely to: 1) build the patented invention the
229
competitor wants to design around as a first step, and 2) build
multiple attempts to design around the patent that would still
infringe. The process of designing around a patent seems to
encourage infringement as long as the end product does not
230
directly infringe. Using the patent disclosure to design around a
patented invention is similar to conducting research based on the
patent disclosure. The usual process of designing around a patent
likely involves a great deal of research. The competitor conducting
independent research based on a patent and the competitor
designing around a patent both have the ultimate goal of
producing a differentiable product that is based on the patented
invention. Yet, the courts seem to encourage designing around
while penalizing commercial research. Designing around the
patented subject matter is clearly a “commercial purpose.”
Consequently, exploratory research using the patented subject
matter should not be deemed infringement simply because the
research might be linked to a future commercial purpose to the
researcher.
One major difference between designing around and
exploratory research is that in designing around, the ultimate goal
is to produce a product that does not infringe, whereas research
does not necessarily lead to a non-infringing product. For
example, Merck created a different and more useful product than
231
Integra, but the final product created by Merck still contained
229. This argument assumes that the patented invention is not available on the
market. If the patented invention is available on the market, the competitor
might simply purchase the product from the patentee as a first step, study the
purchased product, and then attempt to design around it.
230. But see Embrex, Inc., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (not allowing the
infringing defendant to use the experimental use exemption as a defense to
patent infringement when the defendant made and used the plaintiff’s patented
machine for experiments in an attempt to design around the patent).
231. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 863 (noting Merck’s research
created a new cyclic RGD peptide product potentially effective and safe enough to
warrant clinical human testing).
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the limitations of Integra’s claims (the peptide sequence RGD) and
232
The patentee may
therefore still infringed Integra’s patent.
claim an invention comprising the elements A-B-C, where the
researcher’s final product may contain the narrower group of
components A-B-C-D. The researcher’s final product is indeed
different, but it still contains all the elements (A-B-C) of the
patented invention. Consequently, the researcher could not
233
commercialize his product without infringing the patent.
However, as discussed more in depth later, this does not necessarily
mean that the researcher should be barred from conducting his
research on the patented invention in the first place.
The full disclosure rule, the encouragement of designing
around a patented invention, and the rapid appearance of
independent improvements to patented inventions all point to the
conclusion that the patent system tolerates the public’s use of the
patent disclosure to improve upon the patented subject matter.
Therefore, the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions, including Integra
v. Merck, construed the experimental use exemption too narrowly
based on the existence of potential commercial purpose.
The full disclosure rule effectively supports free use of
patented subject matter for research. But on a more fundamental
level, the patent system should allow free use of patented subject
matter for research purposes. The ultimate purpose of the patent
system is to create an incentive to invent. Based on that incentive,
the patent monopoly should not be construed to exclude research
activities.
2. The Patent Monopoly and Incentive to Invent Arguments
a. Purpose and Theory Behind Patent Law
The Constitution of the United States authorized a patent
system in order to “promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the

232. See id. at 868-69 (rejecting Merck’s argument that its product was noninfringing due to the cyclic structure of Merck’s RGD peptide).
233. For comparison’s sake, the party designing around the patented invention
would attempt to create a product such as A-B-E. Although A-B-E will be very
similar to patentee’s A-B-C and may directly compete with it, since A-B-E does not
contain all of the elements of the patented invention, it is not infringing and can
be commercialized.
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234

exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”
A
patent gives its holder the right to exclude others from making,
235
using, or selling the patented invention for a term of twenty
236
years.
237
A patent is an anomaly in our economic system. The United
States economy favors capitalism and free competition over all
238
other ideals. Our wide body of antitrust law provides ample
239
One of the
evidence that our government favors free trade.
greatest impediments to free competition is a governmentsanctioned monopoly, such as a patent. In addition, patents are
contrary to the general scientific principle that discoveries should
240
be disclosed for the benefit of all.
Scientists are generally
inclined to share their discoveries with fellow scientists, at least in
241
the academic fields, to allow all to benefit from their discoveries.
Full disclosure allows other scientists to validate the findings and
also prevents duplicative research. Thus a patent that allows the
inventor to preclude the public from using the invention for
research is counter to the traditional scientific norms as well as the

234. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. This clause of the Constitution also allows for
copyrights to authors. See id.
235. See 35 U.S.C §§ 154(a)(1), 271(a) (2003) (granting the patentee “the
right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the
invention . . . .”).
236. See 35 U.S.C § 154(a)(2) (2003) (allowing twenty-year patent term from
the date of filing the patent application).
237. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1966) (noting that
Thomas Jefferson, when acting as a founder of the patent system, had aversions to
the patent monopoly and monopolies in general and wanted the patent to be only
as strong as necessary to promote invention).
238. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 92 (7th ed. 1999) (defining “antitrust law” as
“[t]he body of law designed to protect trade and commerce from restraints,
monopolies, price-fixing, and price discrimination”). The federal antitrust laws
are generally set forth in the Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7) and the Clayton Act
(15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27). Id.
239. See LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST, § 5, at 20
(1977) (noting that “[a]s legislative history and case law both disclose, the general
objective of the antitrust laws is the maintenance of competition. Competition per
se thus becomes a goal of the legal order”).
240. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1046-47. Enforcing patent rights
against researchers “fundamentally conflicts with traditional scientific norms
calling for free dedication of new knowledge to the scientific community.” Id. at
1046. The tradition among scientists, at the very least in the non-commercial
sector, has always been to publish their results for the benefit of all. Id. at 1046-47.
Allowing others to use a new discovery to their advantage prevents duplicative
research, which wastes time, wastes resources, and benefits no one. Id. at 1028-47.
241. See id. at 1046-47.
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capitalist ideal of free competition.
Multiple theories explain the purpose of awarding patents.
Main theories include: 1) the patent system gives an inventor his
242
natural right to be the only one to profit from his creation; 2) the
patent system encourages public disclosure of inventions that
might otherwise be used as a trade secret and not publicly
243
disclosed; and 3) the patent system spurs innovation and gives
244
people an incentive to invent.
The natural rights theory, that an inventor deserves a
monopoly as his natural right for inventing, was expressly rejected
245
by the Supreme Court in the case of Graham v. John Deere Co. The
Court supported Thomas Jefferson’s view that the patent is based
on social and economic rationales, intended to be a reward to
246
induce people to “bring forth new knowledge.” The Court noted
the “high level of patentability” and the strict requirements that
must be met before obtaining a patent (novelty, utility, and non247
obviousness).
Another argument in support of the Court’s
242. See Graham, 383 U.S. at 9 (discussing how the patent was not created to
represent an inventor’s natural right to his/her invention).
243. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 494 (1974) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (finding “the existence of trade secret protection provides in some
instances a substantial disincentive to entrance into the patent system, and thus
deprives society of the benefits of public disclosure of the invention which it is the
policy of the patent laws to encourage”); Winston Research Corp. v. Minnesota
Mining & Mfg. Co., 350 F.2d 134, 138 n.2 (9th Cir. 1965) (“The federal patent
statutes require full disclosure of the invention as a condition to the grant of
monopoly . . . . Thus, the federal patent statutes would seem to reflect a
congressional determination that any individual or social interests which may be
served by secrecy [or a trade secret law] are outweighed by those served by full
disclosure.”).
244. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-30. Eisenberg notes two
main theories behind the patent’s purpose: the incentive to invent and the
incentive to disclose. Id. She also notes a more abstract theory that the patent
provides an “incentive to innovate” that is distinct from an incentive to invent. Id.
at 1036-38.
245. 383 U.S. at 9 (noting commentary from the 1800s on the subject by
Thomas Jefferson and stating that “[t]he patent monopoly was not designed to
secure to the inventor his natural right in his discoveries. Rather it was a reward,
an inducement, to bring forth new knowledge.”).
246. See id. (supporting Thomas Jefferson’s belief that the patent “was the
creation of society—at odds with the inherent free nature of disclosed ideas—and
was not to be freely given.”). Regarding Thomas Jefferson, the Court states,
“[b]ecause of his active interest and influence in the early development of the
patent system, Jefferson’s views on the general nature of the limited patent
monopoly under the Constitution, as well as his conclusions as to conditions for
patentability under the statutory scheme, are worthy of note.” Id. at 7.
247. See id. at 8-9. See also CHISUM, supra note 1, at chs. 1-5 (detailing the

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol30/iss3/9

38

Sandstrom: How Much Do We Value Research and Development?: Broadening the Ex
SANDSTROM - FINAL.DOC

2004]

3/30/2004 11:38 PM

EXPERIMENTAL USE EXEMPTION

1097

reasoning in Graham is that if the patent were a natural right of the
inventor, it should last forever rather than expiring after twenty
years. In general, a natural right should not expire after a set
period of time.
The other two theories, incentive to publicly disclose and
incentive to invent, are the reasons most commonly advanced as
248
the purpose of the patent system.
The incentive-to-disclose
argument has been favored by courts but has had less support from
249
economists.
In most cases, if patents did not exist, the public
eventually would be able to gain disclosure of the invention by
250
buying the product and reverse engineering it. Although reverse
engineering probably is more difficult than reading the disclosure
of a patent, this reason alone is not enough to justify the patent
system. For the few inventions that cannot be reverse engineered
and can be effectively used as a trade secret, it does not make sense
for the inventor to seek a patent. A patent requires disclosure and
the protection lasts for only twenty years, but a trade secret
251
theoretically could be exploited perpetually as a monopoly. The
full disclosure rule alone is not an effective argument to justify
patents.
The best argument in favor of a patent system is that the
252
patent provides a reward that induces creative minds to invent.
In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that the patent monopoly was
designed to be “a reward, an inducement, to bring forth new
253
knowledge.”
Without the reward of the patent monopoly, an
inventor’s invention would be too easy for competitors to
misappropriate and sell without the expense and effort of having to
254
invent.
Inventing may be expensive, as it consumes time,
manpower, and large amounts of money. Copying, on the other
hand, is always cheaper. Without patent protection, inventors
patentability criteria of eligible subject matter (ch. 1), originality (ch. 2), novelty
(ch.3), utility (ch. 4), and nonobviousness (ch. 5)). Logically, a patent should not
require passing so many hurdles if it were a natural, inherent right.
248. See Kewanee Oil Co., 416 U.S. at 480-81 (noting that patents provide an
incentive or reward to inventors to encourage inventing, as well as a method to
ensure public disclosure of the invention for the benefit of the public’s use once
the patent expires); Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-29.
249. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1028-29.
250. Id. at 1029.
251. Id.
252. See id. at 1024-26; Graham, 383 U.S. at 9.
253. 383 U.S. at 9.
254. Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1024-28.
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would be less likely to invent for fear of their ideas being stolen and
potential financial rewards being obtained by competitors. If the
inventor must face free competition, the market price of the
invention may be driven down to the point where the inventor can
no longer recoup the initial investment cost of creating the
255
invention, which the free-loading competitors do not have to pay.
The patent monopoly allows the inventor to stop infringers,
increases profitability of the invention, and creates a stronger
incentive to invent.
b. Application of the Incentive-to-Invent Theory
Because the incentive-to-invent argument seems to be the
strongest underlying purpose of the patent system, the
experimental use exemption should be analyzed in view of the
incentive to invent. Would there still be an adequate incentive to
invent and obtain patents if the experimental use exemption were
broadened, allowing researchers to freely use inventions for
research purposes? A broader experimental use exemption would
promote free use of ideas, would encourage competitors to study
and improve upon patented subject matter, and arguably would
spur more innovation. However, a broader experimental use
exemption also weakens the patent monopoly, possibly decreasing
256
the incentive to invent in the first place.
A balance must be
struck between the two competing objectives.
The current judicial trend appears to be to weaken, if not
257
eliminate, the experimental use exemption. The Integra decision
leans toward the view that the power to exclude and monopolize
258
should be all-encompassing. Judge Rader stated in dicta that the
patent statute did not allow for an experimental use doctrine, and
that the judge-made experimental use doctrine was better
addressed by limited damages to the patentee when infringement
was de minimis, rather than an outright exemption from
259
260
infringement. Similarly, in Madey v. Duke University, the Federal
255. Id. at 1025.
256. See Karp, supra note 17, at 2169 (arguing that a broad experimental use
exemption would decrease the incentive to innovate, would not result in a
corresponding increase in research, and would, therefore, lead to a decline in the
rate of invention).
257. See supra Part II.B.
258. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir.
2003).
259. Id. at 864 n.2.
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Circuit held that if the researcher’s use of the patented subject
matter could be linked to the slightest commercial purpose or
legitimate business interest, then the experimental use exemption
261
should not apply.
These Federal Circuit decisions eliminate any
useful facet of an experimental use exemption.
Congress has considered enacting a statutory experimental use
262
exemption but has failed to do so.
A 1988 bill on patenting
transgenic animals originally included an experimental use
263
exemption, but the exemption was later removed from the bill.
Upon removing the exemption, the House Report suggested
instead that sometime in the future, Congress should enact an
264
experimental use exemption that applied to all inventions.
Shortly thereafter, the Patent Competitiveness and Technological
Act of 1990 proposed a broad experimental use exemption
supported by the House Judiciary Committee but not enacted by
265
Congress.
The Plant Variety Protection Act contains a fairly
broad experimental use exemption, but it is limited to plant
266
patents. Clearly, Congress has contemplated an experimental use
exemption for patents but has failed, as of yet, to enact one.
Judge Newman’s dissent in Integra favored a broader
experimental use exemption—specifically, an exemption that
would protect research activities, such as Merck’s, that have a
267
commercial undertone. Judge Newman framed her argument on
the full disclosure aspect of patent law, as well as the generalization
that research and improvement on patented subject matter
268
historically have always been allowed.
This note illustrates that
the argument in favor of a broad experimental use exemption can
260. 307 F.3d 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
261. See id. at 1362.
262. See Johnson, supra note 17, at 528-29.
263. Id. at 528.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 529. See also H.R. REP. NO. 101-960, pt. I (1990).
266. 7 U.S.C. § 2544 (2003). See also Peter J. Goss, Comment, Guiding the Hand
That Feeds: Toward Socially Optimal Appropriability in Agricultural Biotechnology
Innovation, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1395, 1408-10 (1996) (noting that the experimental use
exemption was narrowed by Congress in 1994). “Congress attempted to limit the
potential for abuse of the experimental use exemption by declaring that varieties
‘essentially derived’ from protected varieties are infringing . . . .” Id. at 1410
(quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2541(c)(1) (1994)).
267. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 876 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Judge Newman stated that “an ultimate goal or hope of profit from successful
research should not eliminate the [experimental use] exemption.” Id.
268. See id. at 876-77.
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also be made on the basis of the incentive to invent.
A patent system with a broader experimental use exemption
would continue to spur innovation by providing patentees with
adequate protections from infringement. An inventor would still
have the sole right to commercialize the invention. If the invention
is a product, then the inventor would still have the sole right to sell
the invention. If the invention is a process, then the inventor
would still have the sole right to sell products made with the
patented process. A patentee’s commercialization should be the
main source of revenue for a majority of inventions, rather than
licenses to competitors conducting research. The patentee would
still be able to gain back any money invested into creating the
patented invention and also make a profit through commercial
sales. This would be true regardless of whether the competitive
researcher’s purpose is purely “philosophical” or if the research is
conducted with an eye toward future profits. Either way, a patent
that allows others to research but not commercialize would provide
the patentee with ample incentive to invent.
c. Harmonizing the United States with Foreign Patent Practices
Some commentators argue that weakening the patent
monopoly will decrease the incentive to invent, leading to a
269
decrease in the rate of invention.
Compared to other countries,
the United States has always had strong patent protection and has
been, and is currently, one of the highest ranked producers of
270
technological innovation. But it does not necessarily follow that a
broader experimental use exemption will decrease the rate of
innovation. Countries including Japan, Germany, France, Italy,
Spain, Switzerland, Sweden, Canada, and the United Kingdom,
271
have high “innovative capacity.”
Many top innovators, such as
269. See Karp, supra note 17, at 2187-88 (arguing “[a]ny weakening of the
patent monopoly will discourage inventors from utilizing patent protection” and
proposing instead to use compulsory licensing from patentees to researchers for a
“reasonable royalty” that is paid only when the research “resulted in a benefit to
the experimenter”).
270. See Michael E. Porter & Scott Stern, The New Challenge to America’s
Prosperity: Findings from the Innovation Index 34 (1999), available at
http://www.compete.org/pdf/innovation.pdf (last visited March 24, 2004). A
Washington, D.C., think tank known as the Council on Competitiveness
conducted a study comparing the “innovative capacity” of the United States and
other countries. Id. The study consistently ranked the United States as one of the
top innovators in the world. Id.
271. Id.
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Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Korea, and
Canada, have broad experimental use exemptions in their patent
272
law.
Yet, these countries continue to create many innovative
products, and their citizens continue to seek patent protection
273
It cannot be said that a
from their respective patent systems.
broad experimental use exemption necessarily will lead to a
decrease in innovation.
The broad experimental use exemptions in other countries
may place American inventors and researchers at a disadvantage.
Today, many inventors seek patent protection in their own country
274
as well as in other countries. Consider when a Japanese company
receives a patent both in Japan and the United States. Other
competitive researchers in Japan would be able to freely conduct
research on the patentee’s invention due to Japan’s broad
experimental use exemption. But in the United States, the
Japanese patentee can prevent American researchers from
commercially researching the patented subject matter under the
275
current law.
This problem occurs with respect to every country
that has a broad experimental use exemption. Competitive
researchers in foreign countries can and will receive patents on
derivative subject matter, whereas the American competitive
researchers do not even have a chance to conduct research on the
foreign inventor’s patented invention. A correspondingly broad
experimental use doctrine in the United States would eliminate
272. See John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 17 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 685, 718-19 (2002); Mueller, supra note 15, at 37-40; Eisenberg, Patents,
supra note 17, at 1018 n.6; Johnson, supra note 17, at 527.
273. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Who’s Patenting What? An Empirical
Exploration of Patent Prosecution, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2099, 2148 (2000). In the United
States patent system, only about fifty-five percent of patents are from American
inventors. Id. Japan, Germany, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Korea, and
Canada were all in the top ten foreign countries for most patents filed in the
United States. Id. The author makes the assumption that the vast majority of
inventors seek protection in their own countries, as well as seeking U.S. patent
protection.
274. See UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2001—WORKLOAD TABLES 112-16 (2002),
available
at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2001/01accompinfo.pdf
(last
visited March 24, 2004) [hereinafter USPTO Performance and Accountability]. Of
the 344,717 patent applications filed in the United States in 2001, forty-five
percent were filed by residents of foreign countries. Id. Of the 187,822 patents
issued in 2001 by the USPTO, forty-six percent went to residents of foreign
countries. Id.
275. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-62 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
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this problem.
d. Lost Profits and Patented Inventions That Are Only Useful
for Research
A broader experimental use exemption might create
unfairness to the patentee if the invention is not commercially
successful but still has research potential. This was the unfortunate
case for Integra. Integra knew its patented RGD peptide was
useful, but could not seem to produce a product that was
276
Dr. Cheresh saw potential value in the
commercially viable.
invention, and Merck funded his further study of the RGD
277
peptides. In such a case, Integra’s only revenue from the patents
would be from licenses to outside researchers, such as Dr. Cheresh
and Merck. To prove that such revenue can be substantial, one
only needs to consider the $15 million jury award of reasonable
278
royalties to Integra.
On the other hand, forcing researchers to seek licenses will
hamper further research. Researchers may not have millions of
dollars to pay royalties and would be especially reluctant to pay
royalties unless research will surely lead to a valuable product. In
more extreme cases, a patentee may refuse to grant a license if the
patentee views a researcher as a hungry competitor out to design a
competing product based on the patented invention, rather than a
279
customer willing to pay royalties for it.
A broader experimental
use exemption would eliminate these restraints on research; but
eliminating royalties to patentees also reduces the patentee’s
profits.
276. See Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 873. The RGD peptide was
actually discovered and patented by co-plaintiff Telios Pharmaceuticals in the midto late 1980s. Telios was unable to develop a commercially viable product and sold
all of its patent rights to Integra in December of 1996. Id.
277. Id. at 863.
278. See id. at 862. Although the Federal Circuit reversed the jury’s award of
$15 million for lack of substantial evidence, the figure gives a rough estimate of
what research licenses can be worth. Id.
279. See Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights, supra note 210, at 224. The author
postulates:
The patent holder . . . has an interest in prolonging the period in
which the public is dependent on the patented technology. If the
patentee sees the research user as a competitor rather than a customer,
she may refuse to license the invention. Without an experimental use
defense, it is possible that no one would be able to build on the
inventor’s discovery until the patent expired.
Id.
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However, the patent system is not in place to guarantee
maximum profits to the inventor, but instead to promote
invention. The royalties from other researchers might add to an
inventor’s wealth, but the loss of such financial benefits can hardly
280
take away all of scientists’ incentive to invent. Very few inventors
set out to invent a product that appeals only to other researchers.
A majority of scientific research is aimed to create a product that
will achieve eventual commercial success in the general consumer
market. Therefore, scientists arguably would continue to innovate
even if a broader experimental use exemption might eliminate
potential royalties from other researchers.
On the other hand, a patentee could lose revenue from a
broader experimental use exemption due to: 1) lost royalties from
researcher licenses; 2) lost revenue when the outside researcher
successfully designs around a patented invention and creates a
directly competitive product; and 3) lost revenue when other
researchers create a separately patentable derivative product that
the patentee could have otherwise invented but failed to. However,
none of these harms to the patentee should deter the
implementation of a broader experimental use exemption.
First, very few inventions gain major revenue from license
281
royalties. Most revenue from a patent should come from the sale
of products to consumers rather than research royalties. If most of
the revenue comes from research royalties, should a patent on the
invention be awarded at all? Such an invention does not benefit
the public in a direct sense, since the public is not buying the
product.
The only public benefit occurs if a subsequent
researcher, paying royalties, creates a publicly useful product.
Perhaps the subsequent inventor of the derivative, publicbenefiting product should be the only person rewarded with a
patent. The patent system should encourage inventions with public
280. Most patented inventions never attain wide commercial success, and
receiving a patent does not guarantee success in the marketplace. See Frank H.
Easterbrook, Cyberspace Versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 106 (1999)
(“Most inventions receive no royalties; about ten percent earn significant returns,
and a very few have huge payoffs”). Furthermore, a large number of inventions do
not even receive patents due to a failure to meet the strict statutory requirements
of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness. For example, from 1997 to 2001, the
Patent Office granted patents to only seventy to seventy-two percent of the patent
applications processed to completion during the year. See USPTO Performance and
Accountability, supra note 274, at 106. Yet the patent system continues to stimulate
the search for new products and processes in the hopes for commercial success.
281. See Easterbrook, supra note 280, at 106.
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benefit more than inventions that require further research to be of
public use. A broader experimental use exemption promotes
creating publicly desired inventions because a patentee could
derive profits only from public sales rather than licenses to other
researchers. The one exception to this rule is for inventions
termed “research tools,” which are described in more detail
282
below.
Second, a patentee loses revenue from competitive researchers
who create a directly competing product. This should not stop a
broader experimental use exemption. Patentees lose the most
revenue when a competing product is invented that creates a better
283
and/or cheaper solution to the same problem.
As discussed
284
Allowing
earlier, this is known as “designing around” a patent.
researchers to design around a patent clearly decreases the
patentee’s incentive to invent. But, as noted above, the patent
system already encourages designing around a patent because the
285
American economy derives benefit from free competition.
Patentees already face the possibility that a competitor will design
around the patent. A broader experimental use exemption would
only make designing around a patent less risky, as researchers
286
would not have to worry about infringement charges. A broader
experimental use exemption would further promote an already
existing ideal.
Third, the fact that a competitor might create a separably
patentable derivative invention will only spur more innovation.
The risk of competition would lead a patentee to create and patent
any derivative products even more quickly to avoid the potential
loss of derivative patents to competitors. A broader experimental
use exemption would bring about a more rapid development of
improvements on patented subject matter and also derivative
282. See infra Part IV.B.2.e.
283. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035-36 (noting that when a
researcher aims to develop a competing product, a broader experimental use
exemption lowers the patentee’s profits, and thus also the incentive to invent, in
two ways: first, by denying the patentee of royalties that would have otherwise been
paid; and second, by threatening to “cut short the effective duration of the patent
holder’s monopoly if the user succeeds in developing a competing technology”).
284. See infra Part IV.B.1.c.
285. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
286. See Embrex Inc. v. Serv. Eng’g Corp., 216 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2000)
(awarding patentee infringement damages against a competitor who made and
used the patented invention for research in an attempt to design around the
patent).
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products. In this sense, revenue loss to the patentee due to a
broader experimental use exemption is justified.
e. Special Rules for Research Tools
Products intended from the start to be valuable only to other
researchers are usually termed as “research tools.” A research tool
is “a product or method whose purpose is use in the conduct[ing]
287
One simple example of a research tool would
of research . . . .”
be a chemist’s test tube. The inventor of a patented test tube
intends to sell it, for the most part, to other researchers. The test
tube itself is not being researched, but functions as a tool to
conduct research. The majority and dissent in Integra disagreed
about whether Integra’s RGD peptide was a research tool. The
majority held that the RGD peptides were a research tool, but the
dissent called them “simply new compositions having certain
288
biological properties.”
However, both the majority and dissent
seem to agree that the experimental use exemption should not
apply to unrelated research conducted using a patented “research
289
tool.”
Using the test tube example, if a chemist copies a patented test
tube and uses it to perform other experiments, then neither the
majority nor dissent in Integra would allow the chemist to claim an
experimental use exemption if the test tube patentee sues.
However, Judge Newman realized and noted that if a researcher
was studying and trying to improve upon the research tool itself,
then the experimental use exemption (if broadened) should
290
apply.
But, as a matter of common sense, if the value of an
invention is to serve as a research tool, the use of such an invention
to conduct other research cannot be exempted from infringement
under the experimental use exemption. If such use is exempted,
291
the patent on the research tool would lose all of its value. In the
287. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 878 (Newman, J. dissenting).
288. Id. at 871-72, 878.
289. See also Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035 (noting that allowing
researchers an exemption when using so-called research tools “would plainly
undermine the interest of the patent holder” and “thereby reduce incentives to
make and disclose such inventions in the future.”).
290. See 331 F.3d at 878 (“There is a fundamental distinction between research
into the science and technology disclosed in patents, and the use in research of
patented products or methods, the so-called ‘research tools’ . . . Use of an existing
[research] tool in one’s research is quite different from study of the tool itself.”).
291. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1035 (noting a broader
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face of a broader common-law experimental use exemption, the
courts would have to closely distinguish between research done to
improve the research tool itself and unrelated, infringing use of a
patented research tool. A further difficulty is to distinguish what
constitutes a research tool and what does not—a point upon which
292
the majority and dissent in Integra did not agree.
Other than
carefully distinguishing between a research tool and non-research
tool, a broader experimental use exemption comports with the
purpose of the patent system: to encourage scientific invention and
technological innovation.
A patent system with a broader experimental use exemption
still rewards patentees with adequate protection, allowing them the
sole right to commercialize their products and make a return on
their investments. At the same time, a broader experimental use
exemption could accelerate the rate of improvements on patented
subject matter and the creation of derivative products by giving
other researchers free use of the invention to conduct further
research. This broader experimental use exemption should apply
despite the researchers’ intentions to commercialize their research
at a later date.
3. Limiting the Experimental Use Exemption
This note advocates a broader experimental use exemption,
one that would allow researchers to freely use patented subject
matter in their research. The broader exemption should apply
even if a researcher may have a commercial purpose in mind.
Unless the exemption has some limitations, however, unrestrained
research could quickly turn into usurpation of a patentee’s rights
when other researchers profit from the use of the patentee’s
technology.
The person researching a patented technology must not be
allowed to commercialize or profit from the sale of the patentee’s
invention during the patent term. Allowing researchers to profit
experimental use exemption should not apply to the use of research tools because
such patents would have no value, thus eliminating the patent’s incentive and
leading to a decline in the creation of research tools).
292. See 331 F.3d at 878. The majority seems to hold that the RGD peptide was
a research tool because the defendant Merck used the RGD peptide in their
research. Id. at 872 n.4. Dissenting Judge Newman viewed the RGD peptides
instead as “simply new compositions having certain biological properties” and
characterized Merck’s activities as “syntheses and evaluations of new RGD
peptides.” Id. at 878.
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from selling the patentee’s claimed invention would strip away
some, if not most, of the incentive of obtaining a patent. Once the
competitor goes beyond research and begins to commercialize a
product, the full force of the original patent must be in effect
against the competitor. In addition, some other limitations might
be prudent.
The range of possible limitations placed upon the research
exemption includes: 1) exempting only non-commercial research,
2) exempting all research from infringement, 3) exempting only
research that is not “essentially derived from” or relies heavily on
293
the patented invention,
or 4) exempting all research, but
imposing a reasonable royalty for commercialization of any noninfringing derivative product.
First, an experimental use exemption that exempts only non294
commercial research is the current state of the law and is too
narrow.
As noted by commentators, infringement by non295
Thus, this rule has
commercial researchers is rarely prosecuted.
little if any usefulness.
Second, allowing all research on patented subject matter to be
exempt, even if the research has a commercial purpose, may
decrease the incentive to invent. Under such a rule, a researcher
would be allowed to profit from his research if he creates a wholly
non-infringing product. If the researcher’s product derived from
another’s patent is considered infringing on the patent, then the
researcher would have to wait until after the patent expires to sell
the derivative product. The result is similar to designing around a
296
patented invention, which is encouraged by courts.
If the
researcher’s product successfully “designs around” the patented
invention, then the researcher can commercialize the new product
and the patentee loses some, possibly all, of the patent monopoly
297
power. As argued above, such a rule might still provide ample
incentive to invent and innovate, but it is the most severe and poses
the greatest risk of decreasing the incentive to invent, as it gives
298
researchers the strongest rights.
293. This language is similar to and derived from the Plant Variety Patent Act,
7 U.S.C. §§ 2541, 2544 (2003).
294. See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1361-63 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
295. See, e.g., Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1019.
296. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text.
297. See infra Part IV.B.2.
298. See Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1036 (hypothesizing that an
exemption “[p]ermitting the unlicensed use of patented inventions for the
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Third, exempting all research that is not “essentially derived
from” or that relies heavily on a patented invention is similar to the
299
rule created under the Plant Variety Protection Act. Such a rule
would give the patentee more rights against researchers. Under
this rule, a researcher that creates a technically non-infringing
product by relying heavily on the patented subject matter would
still infringe the patent. If the researcher, however, created a
substantially different product than the patented one, he should
not owe the patentee any royalties. This rule would be fraught with
ambiguity, difficult to formulate, and difficult to enforce. Drawing
the line between a product that relies heavily on the patent and
one that does not would most likely be a hypertechnical
application, resulting in difficulty for judges and juries. Courts
exert enough effort construing the patent claims and determining
whether an accused infringing product falls within the claim
construction. Creating a rule where a product falls outside the
scope of the respective patent’s claim construction but nevertheless
infringes because it relied heavily on the patent during its
development would be even more difficult to apply.
The final solution is a more moderate approach, as it suggests
creating some type of compulsory license if a researcher wants to
commercialize a derivative product, regardless whether the
300
derivative product infringes the patent.
If the researcher made
purpose of inventing around patents would appear to reduce the value of patents
by shortening the term of effective commercial monopoly,” thus reducing the
incentive to invent).
299. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 2541(c)(1), 2544 (2003) (providing a research exemption,
but also providing that plants “essentially derived from” a protected variety will be
considered infringing). See also J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, 534
U.S. 124, 139-40 (2001).
300. This rule already has at least some support in academia. See Eisenberg,
Patents, supra note 17, at 1078. Eisenberg recommends an experimental use
exemption such that:
A patent holder should not be entitled to enjoin the use of a patented
invention in subsequent research in the field of the invention, which
could potentially lead to improvements in the patented technology or
to the development of alternative means of achieving the same
purpose. However, it might be appropriate in some cases to award a
reasonable royalty after the fact to be sure that the patent holder
receives an adequate return on the initial investment in developing the
patented invention.
Id.
See also Mueller, supra note 15, at 55-58 (supporting Eisenberg’s proposed rule and
proposing a modified version for research tools); Karp, supra note 256, at 2187-88
(arguing for an experimental use exemption that forces an experimenter to pay a
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or used the patented subject matter during the course of the
research, then the researcher would be liable upon
commercialization of the derivative product to pay a reasonable
royalty. The royalty could be based on the extent of the use of the
patented subject matter during research. Because this rule ensures
an after-the-fact payment to patentees, it is almost certain to
continue to spur innovation on the part of inventors seeking
patents. The patentees could recoup some of their investment
from the royalty paid for the use of the patented invention. In
addition, this rule allows free research without the fear of
infringement charges until the researcher creates a commercialized
product. This suggested rule is fairly conservative because it gives
patentees a financial reward in the form of royalties, yet promotes
more research on already-patented subject matter.
C. Combining the Experimental Use Exemption and FDA Approval
Safe Harbor Provision
When a competitor conducts research on a patented product
that also requires FDA approval, as was the case in Integra, the court
should combine a broadened experimental use exemption with the
FDA approval safe harbor provision. In her dissenting opinion in
Integra, Judge Newman states that any of Merck’s allegedly
infringing activities that were not considered “research,” and thus
not covered by the experimental use exemption, should be exempt
from infringement under the FDA approval safe harbor
301
provision.
She argued that in cases where the product required
FDA approval, the experimental use exemption and FDA approval
safe harbor provision should flow seamlessly into one another so as
to avoid an awkward period where the researcher would be liable
for infringement when the activities directly before and after that
302
period are exempt from infringement.
reasonable royalty to the patentee when the research “resulted in a benefit to the
experimenter”).
301. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 331 F.3d at 877.
302. Id. Judge Newman stated:
[T]he territory that the Scripps/Merck research traversed, from
laboratory experimentation to development of data for submission to
the FDA, was either exempt exploratory research, or was immunized by
§ 271(e)(1). It would be strange to create an intervening kind of
limbo, between exploratory research subject to exemption, and the
FDA statutory immunity, where the patent is infringed.
Id.
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Judge Newman’s argument is both logical and practical. When
considering a product that requires FDA approval, it can be
difficult to determine where the research ends and seeking FDA
approval begins. Once a product is chosen for submission to the
FDA, the applicant may no longer be conducting research, so the
303
experimental use exemption no longer applies.
But when
conducting research and development, the research phase
probably ends and the development phase begins somewhere
304
before the product is ready to submit to the FDA.
The
development stage is most likely, in the language of § 271(e)(1),
“reasonably related” to seeking FDA approval and exempt from
305
infringement. Either way, it would be unreasonable to permit the
competing researcher free use of the patented subject matter for
initial research and later exempt him from infringement while
seeking FDA approval, while also enforcing the patent
infringement in the gray area in between those two stages.
The best rule, as Judge Newman stated, would allow all stages
of research and development, from initial research to the final
stages of FDA approval, to be exempt from infringement. Such a
rule will ensure maximum improvements, development, and
innovation in the drug and medical device markets by allowing
drug companies to freely conduct research on their competitors’
patents, even if the drug company fully intends to create a
commercially viable product. This liberal rule would also ensure
that products derived from patented subject matter can be sent
through the FDA approval process during the patent term and
commercially exploited as soon as the original patent expires, thus
306
furthering the purpose of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
Allowing the
competitive researcher to seek FDA approval on his derivative
product under the safe harbor provision will also enable the
researcher to test if his derivative product is even worthy of FDA
approval.
However, this rule could become difficult to apply if the
experimental use exemption is coupled with a reasonable royalty
for commercialization. The question then becomes, “where does
303. See id. at 876. Judge Newman drew the distinction between “research”
and “development” and stated that the experimental use rule should apply to
research, but submitting information to the FDA should be considered
“development” and no longer exempt under the experimental use rule. See id.
304. See id. at 877.
305. See infra Part II.B.
306. Id.
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the experimental use exemption end and the FDA approval safe
harbor provision begin?” The difficulty lies in the fact that the
proposed experimental use exemption period would require
royalty payments, whereas the FDA approval safe harbor period is
royalty-free. One possibility is that the researcher would owe
royalties until clinical testing begins. In this case, the power of the
FDA approval safe harbor would be somewhat lessened, but would
be easier to administer. Furthermore, companies such as Merck
that are testing new derivative drugs would have more protection
under an experimental use exemption. Overall, allowing all stages
of research and development to be exempt from patent
infringement (including seeking FDA approval) produces more
public benefit than public burden.
V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Circuit in Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA
has followed its prior precedents and narrowly construed the
experimental use exemption to patent infringement. However, this
holding does not further patent law’s overriding goal of
encouraging innovation. Permitting free use of patented subject
matter for further research would lead to faster improvements on
existing and derivative products from patented technology. But
because the scope of the current experimental use exemption is
fairly well established by the Federal Circuit, a legislative approach
307
may be better suited to implement such a change.
If Congress or the federal courts were to broaden the
experimental use exemption, the tough issue would be how far to
broaden it. A very broad exemption to infringement would allow
researchers free use, but might reduce the incentive to invent, and
thus, reduce the rate of invention. The current scope of the
experimental use exemption allows almost no one to conduct
research without a license from the patentee, inhibiting
308
independent research on patented subject matter.
Little
evidence is available to point to the optimal level of patent
307. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722,
739 (2002); Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 28
(1997) (both stating that major changes to well-settled doctrines in patent law
should be handled by Congress rather than the courts).
308. See, e.g., Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (2002) (holding that
even universities conducting educational research cannot invoke the experimental
use exemption).
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309

protection.
One thing is clear: research leads to new inventions, new
discoveries, faster improvements, and more innovation. Forcing
researchers to seek licenses and to pay the patentee royalties to
conduct research is counterproductive in a system that is meant to
promote innovation. Free research means more people will be
financially able to conduct research, and more funds will be
devoted to improvements rather than paying the patentee for
known technology.
A patent system that wants maximum innovation, requires full
disclosure, and encourages designing around a patented invention
should be more enthusiastic about a broader experimental use
exemption. Furthermore, an economy that favors free competition
and is skeptical of monopolies should not be so quick to give
patentees the utmost protection from competition without having
concrete reasons for doing so.
For now, a fairly conservative experimental use exemption
would allow free use of patented subject matter for experimental
use and would require researchers to pay a reasonable royalty only
upon commercialization of derivative products. In the future, an
even stronger experimental use exemption without any royalties,
similar to those in place in countries such as Japan or Germany,
would likely still promote sufficient original innovation while
strongly promoting follow-up inventions, designing around, and
improvements to patented subject matter.

309. Eisenberg, Patents, supra note 17, at 1030. See also Eisenberg, Proprietary
Rights, supra note 210, at 224. The author states:
The optimal extent of the experimental use defense cannot be
determined without attention to its likely effects on the scientific
community. Too narrow a defense could stifle basic research and
impair the community’s mechanisms for validating and building upon
new knowledge. Too broad a defense could cause industrial sponsors
to lose interest in biotechnology research or to rely on secrecy in lieu
of patent protection. There may be no way to avoid both of these
potential problems completely.
Id.
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